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2005 Summer Study Abroad Programs in Brazil
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LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
IN RIO DE JANEIRO
June 25-August 6, 2005
Administered jointly with the
University of Florida
Study Portuguese at Rio's top private language school, the Instituto Brasil-Estados Unidos
(IBEU), in Copacabana. The program features lectures and cultural activities, as well as excur-
sions to historical and cultural sites in the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.
For more information, visit the program website, www.clas.ufl.edu/users/cap/IBEU2005
or contact Dr. Timothy Power at (305) 348-3295, powertj@fiu.edu
PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE AND
BRAZILIAN CULTURE IN
BELO HORIZONTE
June 1-30, 2005
Held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), one of the most
important and traditional universities in Brazil. Courses are taught by FIU and PUC Minas
faculty and include weekend excursions to historic towns such as Ouro Preto, Mariana and
Sabara to view the region's famous baroque art.
For more information, see the program website, www.fiu.edu/-modlang/pages/sap_brazil.htm
or contact Augusta Vono, Program Director, at (305) 349-2049, vonoa@fiu.edu
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S even years ago, Alisa Newman became
managing editor of Hemisphere and of
all publications at the Latin American
and Caribbean Center. Alisa came to
us from LatinFinance and promptly set out to
significantly improve the quality and style of the
magazine. I was especially impressed with the
breadth of knowledge she possessed of Latin
American and Caribbean affairs. As a result, she
became more than a copy editor, she proposed
topics, recruited articles, and edited each and
every one of them to meet the quality standards
that she established for the magazine.
This is the last issue of Hemisphere that bears
Alisa Newman's magical touch. She worked very
closely with Timothy Power, the guest editor of
this issue to produce this outstanding collection
of articles on Brazil. Alisa announced shortly
before this issue was completed that she was leav-
ing LACC and Hemisphere to concentrate on her
family. She and her husband Juan Carlos will be
parents to a second child this coming fall.
We were privileged to have worked with Alisa
and will miss her greatly. LACC wishes her well
and thanks her for the many years of dedicated
effort she gave to Hemisphere. Her duties will be
assumed by Pedro Botta, who will also continue
to produce the magazine. I am delighted to wel-
come him as managing editor.
EDUARDO A. GAMARRA
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bservers of Latin America are well aware that one country is responsible for nearly half of the
region's population and economy. With its continental dimensions, Brazil is large enough to war-
rant a Hemisphere of its own-and that, in fact, is what you have in your hands. In this special
issue, Hemisphere looks at developments in Brazil under its new, history-making president, Luiz
Inicio "Lula" da Silva.
Since his inauguration in January 2003, President Lula has seemed to be everywhere at once. Domestically, Lula
has continued the economic reforms of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and has attempted to deliver
the magic formula that has proven elusive in Brazil's recent past-sustainable growth without inflation. Regionally,
Lula has become the linchpin in a new cooperative axis among the four Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Uruguay), all of which now have socialist or progressive presidents for the first time in history. Globally,
Lula has worked tirelessly to maximize Brazil's visibility and influence in international affairs. Whether pressing the
flesh in a Rio favela, pushing paper in his third-floor office in Brasilia, or skirting the globe in his gleaming new
Airbus A-319, Lula is setting a new standard for activist leadership in Latin America.
This issue of Hemisphere explores Brazilian politics, economics, culture and society. My essay looks at the state of
Brazilian democracy on its twentieth anniversary in 2005. While the regime seems secure in terms of its basic sur-
vival, massive inequality and continual institutional stalemates erode the quality of the democracy that is being deliv-
ered to citizens. Ed Amann's essay on economic performance reviews the many obstacles that inhibit sustainable
development. Many economic challenges are related to the questdo social in Brazil, particularly the country's noted
inability to catch up with Asian competitors in terms of human capital. Roy Nelson explains why, despite its protec-
tionist history, the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) has adopted a more favorable attitude toward for-
eign direct investment since coming to power in 2003.
Tanya Dawkins and Jim Green examine the PT's relationship to organized social movements. Dawkins shows that
Lula's decision to maintain the tight-money, low-inflation policies of his predecessor has led to disappointment with-
in the progressive coalition that backed the PT during its two decades in opposition. The most vocal opposition to
Lulas policies has, in fact, come from the left, leading to important defections from the PT. Green's essay revisits
Brazil's authoritarian legacy and shows that even under the Lula government-which contains many important fig-
ures exiled and tortured by the military regime of 1964-1985-human rights activists are still waiting for a full
accounting of the past.
Two articles examine society and culture. In discussing the diffusion of Brazilian musical forms, Charles Perrone
shows why Brazil is "hot" in terms of its large-and growing-cultural influence. In fact, Lula's minister of culture,
Gilberto Gil, has been a dominant figure in world music over the past four decades. Rosana Resende's essay begins
by illustrating how these cultural influences are washing over South Florida, brought by many thousands of Brazilian
immigrants, and goes on to show the many difficult challenges faced by these new arrivals. The lives of these immi-
grants are dramatized in the Globo network's new telenovela, entitled simply America, which began running in March
2005 and features numerous scenes shot in Miami. Lula is a political figure here as well. On the day of his historic
election in October 2002, the lines snaking out of the polling station set up by the Brazilian Consulate at Coral
Gables High School showed that, politically speaking, Miami has become a Brazilian municipio like any other.
This issue showcases a photo essay by Ricardo Funari documenting life in the arid, impoverished sertdo of the
Brazilian Northeast, whence the future President Lula migrated to Sdo Paulo as a small boy. We also feature a book
review contributed by Hon. Donna Hrinak, the distinguished US Ambassador to Brazil from 2002 to 2004 and a
frequent visitor to FIU. Marian Goslinga closes the issue with a bibliography of new sources on Lula, the PT and
contemporary Brazilian affairs.
I am grateful to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra for the kind invitation to serve as guest editor of this special issue; to the
contributors for their fine essays; and to Pedro Botta and Alisa Newman for their advice and support along the way.
This will be Alisa's final edition of Hemisphere, and my regret at her departure is tempered only by the pleasure of
having worked with her on this special issue on Brazil.
TIMOTHYJ. POWER
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Fragile Threads
by Rosana Resende
It's a balmy summer night and
hundreds of Brazilians gather
in front of an oversize movie
screen on a beach. Yet another
film festival is opening with a
free screening of the previous year's
Audience Award recipient. Later in
the festival, reporters from the
Brazilian network Rede Globo inter-
view filmgoers as they wait. And
wait they must, in long, messy lines,
as promoters for events and products
such as alai ice cream and cachafa
roam the crowd plying their trade.
Surrounding establishments vie for
customers as the screening ends.
Perhaps some will go listen to live
Bossa Nova at a local jazz bar and
cafe, or savor pizza and caipirinhas at
the palm tree-lined outdoor mall
nearby. This particular film festival
draws thousands of people, includ-
ing distribution executives from all
over the Americas, to see the best of
new Brazilian cinema. It is a power-
ful vehicle for disseminating
Brazilian art and culture.
Some miles away, perhaps less
trendy but no less exciting to its
patrons, a restaurant begins its week-
end evening routine, turning down
the lights and opening the dance
floor for forrd night. The live band,
complete with accordion and trian-
gle, essential forrd instruments, belts
out songs as the dancers glide by in
the familiar two-step of the Brazilian
northeast. There are men in cowboy
boots, women in tight, low-riding
jeans, and lots of beer. Some men
complain that the women prefer the
foreign men to the Brazilians, and as
there are many more men than
women here, the women can afford
to be choosy. Before midnight the
numbers peak, crowding out from
the dance floor those eager to show
off fancy footwork and leaving only
sweaty bodies bumping up against
each other while trying to avoid
stepping on any feet. A typical
Saturday night in Brazil, you might
think, and in fact none of this
would be remarkable were it taking
place in Rio, Salvador or Recife.
But I am describing a night in South
Florida.
Fragile Threads
These examples are only a few
manifestations of the expanding
Brazilian presence in South Florida,
but they encapsulate some striking
aspects of the Brazilian population
living in the area; namely, its diversi-
ty and geographical spread. Much
as in Brazil itself, Brazilians in South
Florida have little more in common
than language and nationality, and
in fact often seem to function in dis-
tinct and disjointed worlds divided
by social class, region of origin, faith
and, here in the United States, docu-
ments. To speak of a Brazilian
"community" in South Florida is
somewhat of a misnomer. The eth-
nic press echoes the sentiments of
many local Brazilians when it calls
for more community and complains
of a lack of solidarity. Large out-
pourings of national pride, evident
after World Cup soccer victories,
dissipate into fragmented preferences
and possibilities for just about every-
thing else, from the trite (which
beach to hang out on) to the telling
(how often to visit Brazil). National-
ity and language, as it turns out, are
rather fragile threads by which to
knit a community.
But just who, and where, are these
Brazilians of South Florida? The
three southeastern counties of
Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm
Beach are home to a sizable Brazilian
population, with estimates running
from 20,000 on the conservative end
to upwards of 200,000. The real
number, likely in the middle of this
range, is difficult to divine, as is the
case with any immigrant population
that includes an undetermined num-
ber of undocumented persons.
What is certain, however, is that
varying concentrations of Brazilians
from all regions of Brazil live in this
area, from southern Miami-Dade
(Kendall) to northern Palm Beach
(Delray Beach). Pompano Beach
and Deerfield Beach in Broward
have whole strip malls of Brazilian-
owned and targeted businesses. The
tri-county area now boasts a public
school that offers a fully bilingual
curriculum with 40% of instruction
in Portuguese, two Brazilian cultural
centers, more than 30 churches and
temples, and countless restaurants,
stores, nightclubs and markets. This
immigrant stream includes the exec-
utives who organize events like the
Brazilian Film Festival, those who
attend it, and those who park the
cars of the moviegoers and clean up
the theater after hours. Three years
of researching this population in
Miami-Dade and Broward counties
have led me to conclude that
Brazilian immigration shows no sign
of stopping and only promises to
increase in size and diversity.
Tropical Brazucas
Renewed waves of disappointment
in Brazil as the purported "land of
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Brazilians in South Florida
Since the 1980s, Miami has attracted a diverse lot of Brazilian immigrants.
the future" have ensured a steady
stream of people leaving the country
in search of opportunity and stabili-
ty. Beginning in the early 1980s, on
the heels of democratization, intensi-
fying with the disillusionment of the
post-Collor 1990s and beyond-as
both Cardoso and now Lula failed to
deliver a sustainable economic mira-
cle-emigration has steadily become
a viable option for Brazilians, whose
image of their own country is that of
a land of immigrants.
According to Itamaraty, Brazil's
Ministry of Foreign Relations,
approximately two million Brazilians
live outside of Brazil. Brazilians are
scattered across the globe, with large
populations in Japan and Europe,
including many who gained entry by
heritage claim. But most Brazilians
living abroad headed north to
Canada and the United States, so
much so that Globo's new primetime
soap opera, entitled simply America,
specifically deals with the plight of
Brazilian immigrants. In the US,
several metropolitan areas boast sig-
nificant populations of these trans-
plants, most notably New York,
Boston and Miami, with lesser con-
centrations in other cities.
Metropolitan Miami has received
large numbers of immigrants only in
the last 40 years or so, when a large
influx of Cubans fleeing Castro's rev-
olution established the first signifi-
cant enclave. Since the 1980s, how-
ever, the area has grown tremendous-
ly and attracted diverse populations
of Latin American and Caribbean
nationals, including Brazilians. Like
many immigrant groups in the area,
some of the first South Florida
brazucas, as Brazilians in the US are
sometimes called, were at the upper
end of the socioeconomic spectrum,
relocated by their companies or
drawn here by the large concentra-
tion of corporate Latin American
headquarters in Miami.
Even in its origins, the Brazilian
population in South Florida shows
diversity. This trend goes beyond the
eventual diversity of established com-
munities, whereby ever-expanding
networks of employees and relatives
serve to verticalize the social struc-
ture and broaden the geographical
reach. My research thus far indicates
three distinct points of origin, inher-
ently diverse in their makeup. In
addition to the corporate settlers,
other "pioneers" include tourism
industry workers and "snowbirds,"
Brazilians who previously settled in
points north and migrated south-
ward in search of warmer weather.
These three trunks, if you will, in
turn led to different patterns of set-
tlement and expansion, and different
chains of subsequent migrants. The
snowbirds, for example, pulled
Brazilians from other parts of the US
to follow them to sunny Florida.
And where they settled in South
Florida involved questions of space,
affordability and work opportunity.
One former hospitality worker I
met arrived in the 1970s and used to
spend six months a year working
legally in the resorts of Boca Raton
(catering to "traditional" snowbirds)
and the other six months in Brazil.
Eventually, he found stable, year-
round work in downtown Miami,
but without proper work authoriza-
tion, at a Brazilian restaurant that
catered to Brazilian tourists on vaca-
tion. He was able to bring his family
and settled in Broward County
because rent there was less expensive.
Over the years, he normalized his
family's legal status and eventually
came to provide food for Brazilians
in a different way, as the owner of a
Brazilian ethnic market for immi-
grants in Pompano Beach.
Misfits and Backstabbers
The diversity in points of origin
only partly explains the lack of social
cohesion among South Florida
Hemisphere Volume 15 5
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Brazilians. Another, more serious
challenge to community exists:
internal mistrust and disparagement.
Time after time, informants com-
plain of a lack of community feeling
among Brazilians here, that they
would do well to emulate the
"Latins" and unite for the common
good. These same informants insist
that they specifically avoid doing
business with Brazilians, or that
Brazilians can't be trusted. As evi-
dence, I have been told horror sto-
ries of backstabbing, exploitation
and threats-of roommates who
steal each other's jobs, family mem-
bers charging $50 for a car ride,
exorbitant rents, and employers who
refuse to pay their workers and
threaten to report them to immigra-
tion authorities should they com-
plain. The climate of mistrust is
furthered as these cautionary tales
are told to newcomers. As extreme
as these experiences may be, howev-
er, a more pervasive threat is the
resistance on the part of many
Brazilians here to be part of a larger
community.
Consider the story of Vera, once a
successful physician in Brazil. After
a messy divorce, she came to the US
to visit a sister and decided to stay.
She intended (and still hopes) to
obtain a license to practice medicine
here, but as a single mother she
needed a job compatible with her
son's school schedule, leaving her lit-
tle time to learn English or study for
her boards. Today Vera works as a
babysitter. She spent most of our
interview complaining about life in
the United States and comparing it
to the good old days of living in
Brazil. Like many other immigrants
who had careers in Brazil they can-
not practice here, Vera insisted that
she had nothing in common with
the Brazilians who live here, describ-
ing them as mainly uneducated peo-
ple whose only ambition is to make
money.
Other "misfits" like Vera, individ-
uals clearly uneasy with their situa-
tion in the United States, believe in
a Brazilian social hierarchy that
places them in a different category
than the people they find themselves
lumped with here. They distinguish
themselves by prioritizing self-
improvement at an intellectual and
cultural level, versus purely material
gain, and employ a discourse of dif-
ferentiation that further fragments
the community:
"I stopped going to church because all
people talked about was how to get a
green card and how many houses they
cleaned a week. "
"You shouldn't interview me. I have
nothing in common with other
Brazilians here. "
"We moved further north because
there were too many Brazilians in the
area."
"Our people are just no good. "
These are people whose current
economic capital is less than their
cultural capital, blocking their access
to wealthier Brazilian immigrants,
but they will not befriend other
countrymen in their situation. They
also find something lacking in their
social relations with Americans,
whom they consider somewhat dis-
tant. They complain of loneliness
and long for more friends, even
while avoiding friendships with
Brazilians. The social codes they
learned in Brazil are no longer appli-
cable here, but they insist on main-
taining them, focusing less on eco-
nomic achievement or occupation
and more on their former status in
Brazil.
Order and Progress
The distinct points of origin, geo-
graphical spread, and internal dis-
paragement and mistrust that char-
acterize Brazilians in South Florida
are compounded by differences
brought from Brazil, faith and
regional traits, as well as gender, gen-
eration and family structure. These
factors generate a multitude of com-
peting agendas and disjointed proj-
ects, complicating the genesis of
community by encouraging multiple
factions that operate in isolation
from one another.
Despite these differences, Brazilian
immigrants display a remarkable
similarity and simplicity when the
topic turns to the pros and cons of
living in the United States. Whether
the respondents are happy to be here
or not, they invariably cite stability
and opportunity, safety and account-
ability as positive aspects of life in
the US. Here, they say, the laws are
respected and applied equally, and
everyone is treated with fairness and
respect. In the US they find the
ordem eprogresso ("order and
progress") emblazoned on the
Brazilian flag. All that order, howev-
er, comes at the cost of flexibility
and familiarity. Brazilians in the US
complain of robot-like efficiency
and of feeling like a number. The
truth is that despite all the negativity
toward other Brazilians, saudade
looms large: At heart everyone longs
for family and home, and the gener-
al warmth and friendship Brazilians
are famous for. Perhaps when they
begin to recognize that basic need in
their fellow brazucas, the Brazilians
of South Florida can begin to form a
community that bridges the gap
between forrd and bossa nova.
Rosana Resende is a PhD candidate in
cultural anthropology at the University
of Florida. She has presented and
published on the topic of Brazilian
immigration to South Florida and co-
organized the seminar "Brazilians out-
side Brazil" at the University of
Miami in 2002.
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Bananas, Beats, Bossas
by Charles A. Perrone
n the opening scene of Primal
Fear (1996, dir. Gregory
Hoblit), a haunting song
plays. The voice is that of
Portuguese diva Dulce Pontes.
She had the good fortune to catch
the ear of lead actor Richard Gere in
Europe and he lobbied the directors
to use one of her recordings in the
film. The selection was "Cando do
Mar" (Song of the Sea), an appropri-
ate title for a composition destined
to cross the ocean. This cinematic
chance opened the way for the
vocalist to enter specialty music
markets in North America more
attuned to the sonorous exports of
the Portuguese-speaking titan of
South America, Brazil. The movie
production aided Ponte's exposure in
the land of samba and Ipanema as
well. For his part, renowned singer-
songwriter Gilberto Gil gave a brief
solo musical performance at the
University of California Berkeley in
February 2005. His mini-show was
so short because he had come not as
a recognized icon of the popular-
music industry but to deliver an
address on contemporary Brazilian
culture in his capacity as minister of
culture in the Lula administration.
That appointment in itself speaks
volumes about the ascension of
expressive arts in the current govern-
ment. These two episodes nicely
illustrate diversification and transat-
lantic motion in the realm of con-
temporary popular culture. Where
music, Brazilian varieties and for-
tunes abroad are concerned, such
activity has at least a century of his-
tory behind it.
Ever since the birth of the indus-
try, Brazil has been a major overseas
Brazilian popular music charms
the globe, still
client for sound recordings of
song/dance tunes produced in
Europe and the United States. The
tropical nation's celebrated music-
makers have always absorbed stylistic
influences and adapted non-native
elements to local forms. Responses
to the impact of foreign fashions,
notably Anglo-American, have been
evident in Brazilian songwriting
since the 1920s; related commentary
has often been sarcastic or humor-
ous. Since the 1930s, vocalists and
musicians have traveled from Rio de
Janeiro and other cities in Brazil to
leave their marks abroad-New
York, Los Angeles, Paris, Japan,
Latin American capitals-as enter-
tainers, composers, studio hands,
sometimes as actors, producers; in
sum, as players in different senses of
the word. The flamboyant Carmen
Miranda, actually Portuguese by
birth, was the ambassadress of
samba in the 1940s and 1950s on
stage and screen. The Lady in the
Tutti-Frutti Hat was associated with
Uncle Sam's Good Neighbor Policy
during World War II, as were, more
directly, the Latin American animat-
ed features of Walt Disney, Saludos
Amigos and The Three Caballeros,
which showcased Brazilian sounds.
The grand cinematic success Black
Orpheus (1959), a French film, was
tremendously influential in spread-
ing images of Rio de Janeiro, carni-
val samba and incipient Bossa Nova.
The sophisticated samba-jazz of
Ant6nio Carlos Jobim and his new-
knack colleagues created a stateside
sensation in the early 1960s. Since
the mid 1980s, in turn, the US
media have speculated every couple
of years about the coming of a new
"Brazilian wave" or portrayed the
world's fascination with Brazilian
music as old favorites are remem-
bered or new developments catch
the eyes and ears of consumers on
different continents.
In the first years of the twenty-
first century, the New York Times
weighed in frequently on issues of
Brazilian popular music and its per-
formance in cosmopolitan venues,
the music business and publishing
circles. Of particular notice were
three translations of books on
Brazilian music. One was the nicely
illustrated Bossa Nova, the US ren-
dering of the bestselling Chega de
Saudade by journalist extraordinaire
Ruy Castro, an admirable account of
the epoch-making movement in
Brazil. (The Portuguese title is that
of the landmark 1958 song by Joao
Gilberto that was cast as "No More
Blues" in the US jazz repertory.)
The second book to merit attention
was Os Mutantes: The True Story of a
Psychedelic Brazilian Rock Band,
which examines a 1960s trio that
became an object of keen interest in
the post-rock world in North
America. The third and most
prominent book, Tropical Truth, was
the Alfred Knopf-commissioned title
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Music icon Gilberto Gil was appointed Brazil's minister of culture by President
Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva in 2003. (Photo: Cristina Granato)
of Verdade Tropical, a memoir by
Caetano Veloso, the most renowned
of all active Brazilian singer-song-
writers. Along with Gilberto Gil,
Veloso led the eclectic sixties move-
ment known as Tropicalism that
became the subject of numerous
specials in the North American
press, multilingual websites and aca-
demic treatises, such as Christopher
Dunn's Brutality Garden: Tropicilia
and the Emergence of a Brazilian
Counter Culture (2001). Pondering
the international importance of his
field, Veloso writes: "Brazilian music
... is the most efficient means of
the worldwide affirmation of the
Portuguese language, so many are
the admirers who were conquered
by the sonorous magic of the word
sung in the Brazilian way." In addi-
tion to such proud statements,
Veloso writes of relations with the
big powers. Like so many artists
and intellectuals before him, he is
intrigued by parallels between his
land and the United States: "Brazil
is the other giant of America, the
other melting pot of races and cul-
tures, the other promised paradise
for European and Asian immi-
grants, the Other." Gil's diplomatic
missions around the Americas and
his current service in the Lula cabi-
net naturally draw attention,
national and international, to his
origins as a public figure in the
entertainment sphere, as well as to
the mature relationship between
official government channels and
popular musicians, many of whom
strongly supported Lula during his
decades of ascent as political leader.
Veloso's latest recording projects
are more about hemispheric rapport
and internationalization. In the late
1990s he assembled a repertory of
salient Spanish American songs and
toured in support of the album Fina
Estampa. One must remember that
the bolero was prominent enough
on the mid-century musical menu
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of Brazil that a new hybrid genre
was spawned, the sambolero, a vari-
ant of the lyrical samba. The
breadth and Latin American spirit
of Fina Estampa are consistent with
Veloso's concerns for creative reprise
and global perspective. The venture
may have begun as a way by the
recording company to reach Pan-
American markets but it turned out
to be a most elegant exploit indeed,
both in the studio and on stage
(and live CD). A lesson to be
learned from this singer-songwriter's
many colorful roles is that show
business and art really can be mutu-
ally inclusive. Veloso further turned
the language issue on its head with
his 2004 release, A Foreign Sound,
an album consisting entirely of
compositions in English by such
songsmiths as Cole Porter, Neil
Sedaka, Kurt Cobain, Bob Dylan
and David Byrne.
No North American artist has
done more to promote current
Brazilian popular music than the
former leader of Talking Heads. In
1989, Byrne's solo label, Luaka Bop,
issued the landmark CD Beleza
Tropical, a compilation of artists of
the post-Bossa Nova sixties genera-
tion. This Brazil Classics series con-
tinued with a couple of genre
anthologies, O Samba and Forrd Etc.
(traditional accordion-based north-
eastern dance music), followed by a
retrospective and new releases by
the eccentric pop composer and
experimental poet of sound, Tom
Zd, who won special recognition in
several music publications. Byrne
put together a Latin band and
toured with diva Margareth
Menezes, a proponent of neo-Afro-
Bahian axe music (a curious market-
conscious use of the English noun
modified by a Yoruba word for "life
force"). The sponsorship of tradi-
tional and vanguard-inspired musi-
cal offerings from Brazil insured an
otherwise unthinkable exposure,
prompted distribution of the for-
eign-theme collections, and thrust
Brazilian tracks even further into
the whirlwind of so-called "world
music."
Since the mid 1990s, numerous
other US and UK artists-perhaps
most notably the sui generis Beck-
have demonstrated particular inter-
est in aspects of Brazilian popular
music. One extremely interesting
case of new sounds in the 1990s
was an ethno-pop movement in the
northeast called Mangue Beat
(mangue is the shantytown man-
grove wetland in the city of Recife).
If most Brazilian rock of the 1980s
did not stray too far from metropol-
itan models, this local version privi-
leged regional difference, overlaying
funk, hip hop, and metal onto folk
forms, principally the percussion
heavy African-derived carnival prac-
tice known as maracatu. The cen-
terpiece of this postmodern flourish
was Chico Science & Naio
Zumbi, a group plenty aware of tra-
dition but that identified with glob-
al youth culture and cyberspace. As
evidence of its "globalized" enter-
prise, the group sent its first album
to music festivals and promoters
abroad, winning a contract from
Sony Music, which successfully
marketed this fresh "world music."
Chico Science & Nagao Zumbi
appeared at the Montreux Jazz
Festival, CBGBs (a key site of the
New York underground rock scene),
and the Central Park Summer Stage
in New York, which led to a lengthy
feature on National Public Radio.
NPR's Afropop Worldwide pro-
gram, it is worth noting, has a
whole sub-catalogue of Brazilian
shows, including more recent ones
on soul and Jorge Ben Jor (of "Mais
que Nada" fame). Conventional
media like radio are now greatly
complemented by virtual vehicles
(for example, the website
afropop.org and endless Brazilian
sites linked to broadcasters). Chico
Science was one of the first
Brazilian acts to use digital commu-
nication to great advantage. The
Internet, of course, has had a
tremendous and ever-increasing
impact on transnational flows of
music and music information. The
ever-diplomatic Gilberto Gil even
penned a clever tune, "Pela
Internet," that harkens back to the
official origins of samba as an urban
popular form. Brazil has kept up an
outstanding presence in Internet-
based aspects of cultural interaction,
particularly those related to popular
music. The surge of dot-com data
and e-commerce since the 1990s, as
well as the burgeoning aficionado
domains, have truly enhanced access
to, and the growth of, all kinds of
Brazilian popular music around the
globe-acoustic instrumental reper-
tories (carioca choro), samba schools
(Japan to Sweden), Lusophone
brands of rap (and reggae!), lounge
and neo-Bossa Nova (Bebel
Gilberto), original house tracks
(hear London!)-even, when the
stars are aligned appropriately, in
the theaters of Miami Beach. As for
the Internet, Gil's recent happen-
ing-engaging address, provocative
discussion, and charming musical
moments-is archived (http://
webcast.berkeley.edu/events) for all
to relive and contemplate. U
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ABrazilian Democracy at Twenty
by Timothy J. Power
O n March 15, 1985,Brazil's last militarydictator, General Joio
Figueiredo, quietly
slipped out the back
door of the presidential palace.
Figueiredo had refused to hand the
presidential sash to Jose Sarney, who
was sworn in moments later as the
first civilian president in more than
20 years. It is difficult to believe that
20 years have passed since that fate-
ful day. On March 15, 2005,
Brazilians quietly celebrated the
beginning of a third decade of demo-
cratic rule. On the anniversary of
the political transition, in the same
third-floor office once occupied by
the generals who jailed him, sat
President Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva,
the symbol of a new Brazil. The
democratic regime founded in 1985
is now Lula's laboratory. This essay
reviews some of the enduring chal-
lenges to Brazilian democracy but
also highlights some good news not
necessarily in the headlines.
Challenges to Democracy
Many of the key problems of
Brazilian democracy are institutional
in nature. Brazil has one of the most
fragmented party systems in the
world, making it a virtual certainty
that a president will not control a
majority of the seats in Congress.
Currently, the Workers' Party (PT),
founded by President Lula, controls
only 18% of the seats in the lower
house. Given the mathematics of
Congressional support, Brazilian
presidents must behave like
European prime ministers and fash-
ion multiparty cabinets and multi-
party voting blocs on the floor of the
legislature (in 2005, 10 different par-
ties support Lula). Brazilian political
scientist Sdrgio Abranches has given
this system a name: presidencialismo
de coalizao, or coalitional presiden-
tialism. Although presidencialismo de
coalizdo bears a superficial resem-
blance to parliamentarism, there is a
key difference: The survival of the
government in office does not
depend on the loyalty of the nominal
supporters of the president. Parties
can and do abandon the president
on key votes. A telling example
occurred in February 2005, when
despite having built a massive pro-
government coalition in the
Chamber of Deputies, the Lula gov-
ernment could not secure the elec-
tion of its preferred candidate for
speaker. Presidencialismo de coalizdo
is unwieldy and legislative support
comes at a high price. Make no mis-
take: This is still presidentialism, but
a very different type than the com-
paratively user-friendly, two-party
format practiced in the United
States.
One of the reasons for the unpre-
dictability of presidencialismo de coal-
izdo is the weakness of Brazil's party
system. Except for a handful of par-
ties on the left-Lula's PT is by far
the most important-the parties are
largely devoid of ideology and disci-
pline. Most catch-all parties have
weak organizations, generic plat-
forms and low levels of continuity.
In a typical four-year Congress, more
than one in three federal legislators
will switch parties, some more than
once. Elections are largely an indi-
vidual affair and politicians often
believe that their mandate belongs to
themselves rather than to their par-
ties. The personalization of elections
extends to campaign finance, making
Brazilian elections staggeringly
expensive. Current electoral laws
favor high fragmentation, low insti-
tutionalization of parties and mini-
mal party fidelity.
Two other institutional challenges
to Brazilian democracy are executive-
legislative relations and robust feder-
alism. Presidents control much of
the agenda-setting power in Brazil.
More than 75% of all legislation
adopted since 1985 has originated in
the executive branch, often via presi-
dential decrees. Presidents also have
a high level of discretion over public
spending; Congress can only author-
ize the budget, while it is up to the
executive to actually disburse it. The
reactive status of Congress makes leg-
islative life unappealing to many
ambitious politicians. Their prefer-
ence for executive office is under-
standable in the context of Brazilian
federalism; the 1988 constitution
returned more than half of central
revenues to states and municipalities,
making subnational offices (the 5500
mayoralties and especially the 27
governorships) extremely attractive.
Subnational executives control budg-
ets and have the power to hire and
fire, the essence of Brazilian political
careers. State governors are vastly
important; since they often dominate
their state delegations to Congress,
presidents must negotiate with them
continually, especially with regard to
expenditures and debt. Lula's prede-
cessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
drafted a Fiscal Responsibility Law
and forced the privatization of sever-
al profligate state banks, but prob-
lems of federalism continue to lend
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A look at Lula's laboratory
Members of the Brazilian honor guard salute President Jose Sarney as he leaves Jaburu Palace in May 1985. Sarney was Brazil's
first civilian president in more than two decades.
an air of unpredictability to national
politics.
Given these imbalances of power,
the institutional design of Brazilian
democracy favors a strongly clien-
telistic style of politics. All political
systems have patron-client relations,
but in Brazil the concentration of
power in the executive branch creates
a small number of patrons and a very
large number of potential clients. At
the national level, the dynamics of
presidencialismo de coalizdo require
presidents to offer cabinet portfolios
to different parties in exchange for
legislative support, while at the sub-
national level politicians line up in
vertical chains of command extend-
ing from municipal mayors through
state governors to the powerful presi-
dency. These horizontal and vertical
relationships are lubricated by favors,
jobs and pork. The rules of the
game are known to all political actors
and compliance with them is
unavoidable. After 20 years of exco-
riating "traditional politics," since
taking office in 2003 the PT has had
no choice but to follow the time-
honored practices of exchanging jobs
and resources for support from gov-
ernors and legislators. This reality
has dismayed many of Lula's long-
time supporters.
Not all of the obstacles to demo-
cratic consolidation in Brazil derive
from political institutions, of course.
Towering challenges to democracy
are posed by massive poverty,
inequality and social exclusion.
More than a quarter of the popula-
tion is under the official poverty line.
Brazil has one of the worst income
distributions in the world: The
wealthiest 10% control 48% of
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national wealth, while the poorest
10% control less than 1%. Per capi-
ta income has stagnated in recent
years and unemployment has proven
largely intractable to both the
Cardoso and Lula governments.
Economic growth, astounding in the
1950-1980 period, slowed dramati-
cally in the 1980s and was low and
erratic throughout the 1990s. The
prospects for a sustained recovery in
the second half of the current
decade, Edmund Amann argues in
this issue of Hemisphere, are still very
much in question. These dismal
economic results are difficult to
accept for the many Brazilians who
remember the glory days of the post-
war expansion. As the journalist Elio
Gaspari recently pointed out, if the
average 7% growth rate between
1950 and 1980 had been maintained
up to the present day, Brazil would
now have a per capita income on par
with that of Spain.
The simultaneous pressures of
poverty, inequality and social exclu-
sion mean that Brazilian democracy
is under constant stress. Important
pockets of urban Brazil, especially
favelas where drug trafficking is ram-
pant, effectively escape state control.
Meanwhile, in the countryside,
agrarian pressures have led to vio-
lence and standoffs between
landowners and the Landless
Workers' Movement (MST).
Poverty and social exclusion cause
Brazil to continue to underproduce
in the area of human capital, the
undisputed key to today's global
economy. Due to unequal access to
higher education, Brazil's enrollment
rate lags behind that of its regional
neighbors and especially that of
Asian competitors. Some 90% of
Brazilian households have a televi-
sion set, but newspaper circulation
per capita in Brazil is one-third the
level of Argentina or Chile. The
production of education and market-
oriented skills is arguably the biggest
single challenge to Brazilian social
policy today. As a cover story in the
newsweekly Veja put it in early 2005,
"If South Korea can do it, so can
Brazil."
Given lackluster economic per-
formance and the persistence of
social inequalities, it is perhaps not
surprising that public support for
democracy in Brazil is low in com-
parative perspective. Each year, the
Latinobardmetro polling organiza-
tion asks citizens throughout Latin
America whether they think democ-
racy is the best form of government,
whether an authoritarian regime
could sometimes be preferable, or
whether it doesn't matter to them.
In 2003, support for democracy in
Brazil stood at 35%, the second low-
est level in Latin America after
Guatemala, with 33%. (The average
for 17 countries was 53% support).
Some 55% of Brazilians were either
indifferent to the regime type or
openly authoritarian; only Paraguay
at 60% ranked higher on the per-
centage of nondemocrats. While
these numbers do not necessarily
imply trouble in the short term-in
the same poll, Brazilians showed
strong support for the Lula govern-
ment-in the long run, any political
regime must develop a supportive
cultural system or risk breakdown
when confronted by crisis. Clearly,
Brazilian democracy has not yet
developed deep roots at the level of
mass opinion.
Achievements of the Democratic
Regime Since 1985
The challenges to democracy are
immediate and real. However,
democratization since 1985 has also
achieved some undeniable successes
and continues to benefit from certain
favorable conditions. The economic
backdrop to democracy, while unap-
pealing in terms of poverty and
income distribution, has clearly
improved on one important score:
price stability. In 1994, Cardoso's
introduction of the Plano Real gave
Brazil a stable currency for the first
time in memory. The annual infla-
tion rate fell to single digits after
1995, compared to an 80% monthly
rate in 1990. Although dented by
the 1999 devaluation, the Real has
held up reasonably well and celebrat-
ed its tenth anniversary in July 2004.
One should not underestimate the
degree to which stabilization has
removed inflationary populism from
national politics and benefited ordi-
nary Brazilians.
Another point in the regime's favor
is that while public support for
democracy is weak, active opposition
to democracy is even weaker. It is
difficult to conceive of any antide-
mocratic or anti-system actor with
any real presence in national politics.
Take the military, for example. In
the 1946-1964 period, the armed
forces intervened in politics on sever-
al occasions; after the 1964 coup
they governed directly for 21 years;
and during the first postauthoritarian
government of Jose Sarney (1985-
1990) they often acted as veto play-
ers. Today, after 15 years of eroding
budgets and civilian encroachment
upon its prerogatives, the military is
politically impotent. In 1999,
Cardoso created the nation's first
civilian Ministry of Defense, a posi-
tion that has been maintained by
Lula. Comparing the 2002 presi-
dential race to the first direct election
held under democracy in 1989, in
which Lula was a finalist, is instruc-
tive. In 1989, the military, the peak
business association (FIESP), and the
powerful Globo television network
all actively opposed Lula, leading
many to wonder if he could have
taken office if he had won. In the
2002 presidential campaign, these
three conservative actors were largely
invisible. On the left as well there is
little active opposition to democracy.
In terms of elite commitment to
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democratic procedures, the regime
has improved remarkably since the
late 1980s.
Brazilians are justifiably proud of
their consolidation of the electoral
side of democracy. Since the 1980s,
the country has undergone one of
the fastest expansions of the franchise
in the world. In 1955, the electorate
as a share of the population was
25%; in 1975, close to 41%; and in
2005 it is about 64%. In absolute
terms, the electorate is approaching
an astounding 120 million people.
Because of compulsory voting,
Brazil's raw turnout in presidential
elections will soon exceed that of the
United States. This expansion has
been led by the electoral manage-
ment board (TSE), which is recog-
nized for its professionalism and
impartiality. Beginning in 1996,
Brazil adopted an electronic voting
system capable of tallying 100 mil-
lion presidential votes before mid-
night on election day.
The expansion of political partici-
pation has coincided with a remark-
able growth in the organizational
density of civil society, which in turn
is transforming the nation's politics,
economy and culture. As Tanya
Dawkins's article in this issue makes
clear, social movements, NGOs,
unions, churches, neighborhood
associations, and racial and gender
advocacy groups are remarkably
vibrant. These transformations
"from below" constitute arguably the
most striking difference between the
current regime and the previous
democratic experiment in 1946-
1964: Today, a vibrant and diverse
network of fully autonomous sec-
ondary associations provides a coun-
tervailing force against state power.
Together with the dynamic and
aggressive news media, the new civil
society has helped promote increas-
ing openness and transparency in
Brazilian politics, as was evident in
the impeachment of President
Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992.
This is not to say that corruption
has been eradicated-far from it-
but the cost of engaging in such
behavior is higher than ever before.
Impressionistic evidence suggests that
societal tolerance of corrupt politi-
cians-once captured in the reveal-
ing phrase rouba masfaz (he steals,
but he gets things done)-has
declined dramatically over the past
decade.
Although the party system contin-
ues to earn criticism, there are some
signs that it is consolidating. The
last three presidential elections have
been fought between the same two
parties, the Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy (PSDB) and the PT.
The 2002 candidates, Josh Serra
(PSDB) and Lula (PT), were both
committed "party men" who had
spent 14 years and 22 years, respec-
tively, in parties that they themselves
created. This is remarkable. Both of
these political parties are legitimate,
experienced power contenders with
clear visions for Brazilian develop-
ment and both have deep reservoirs
of talent. The fact that they have
now alternated in power is a major
achievement for Brazilian democracy.
Lula's victory in 2002 essentially
"rebooted" the democratic regime,
creating a refreshing new context
wherein all of the major parties have
now been both in government and
in opposition. The conservative
Liberal Front (PFL), which roboti-
cally supported virtually every gov-
ernment since 1964, is now learning
what it is like to live without the
lifeblood of state patronage. Con-
versely, the leftist PT, always partial
to a loud, aggressive, confrontational
style during its two decades in the
wilderness, is learning that it is easy
to oppose but much harder to gov-
ern. Since all of the major parties
have now had their turn at governing
a complex society, elite political cul-
ture is likely to become increasingly
consensual and pragmatic. Political
learning matters.
Finally, one of the major advan-
tages of Brazilian democracy over the
past decade has been strong leader-
ship. In the transition from Cardoso
to Lula, Brazil moved from one his-
tory-making president to another. It
is difficult to think of another Latin
American country that has had two
consecutive presidents of a similar
stature. The fact that they worked
together against military dictatorship
in the 1970s, opposed one another
in the democratic 1980s and 1990s,
and pulled off the most professional
presidential transition in Latin
American history in 2002-2003 is
nothing but good news for the sus-
tainability of democracy. Although
Cardoso and Lula have many policy
differences, they have three essential
similarities: They are modernizers,
they are institution-builders, and
they are antipopulists. Together they
have significantly revised the old rep-
utation of the Brazilian presidency as
a magnet for personalists, populists
and demagogues. Both employed a
"team" style of government with
deep benches of talent and were
unafraid to delegate important tasks
to professionals, and both reached
across the aisle to ally with parties
that were formerly anathema to
them. Although presidencialismo de
coalizdo remains an unwieldy system
of governance, there is no doubt that
first Cardoso and now Lula have
found some ways to make it march
forward in the face of daunting chal-
lenges. These two statesmen must
continue to work together, for it is
their combined legacy that will shape
democracy's third decade and
beyond. U
Timothy J Power is associate professor
ofpolitical science at Florida Inter-
national University and president of
the Brazilian Studies Association
(BRASA).
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A New Era for Brazil's Economy?
by Edmund Amann
T he election of
President Luiz Inicio
Lula da Silva in
October 2002 repre-
sented a milestone in
terms of the consolidation of
democracy in Brazil. Here, appar-
ently, was incontrovertible evidence
that Brazilian political culture had
matured to the point that the elec-
torate at large-and not just a radi-
calized fringe-could embrace an
ostensibly left-leaning candidate
rather than opt for the centrist
continuity offered by the social
democratic alternative. If nothing
else, Lula's triumph demonstrated
that the unspoken fears of instabili-
ty and, in extremis, possible mili-
tary intervention that had stymied
previous attempts by the left to
gain the presidency had, by 2002,
abated.
Once the dust had settled after
the election, attention began to
refocus on the new administration's
policy agenda. The most acute
area of concern, especially among
international investors, related to
Lula's proposed economic reform
package. In the run-up to the elec-
tion, Lula's campaign had spared
no effort in pointing to the defi-
ciencies of the Cardoso administra-
tion (1995-2002), especially as
regarded its record in fostering sus-
tained, socially equitable growth.
To address what it sees as this
unsatisfactory record, the Lula
administration has committed itself
to a multi-track approach that
combines fiscal and monetary
orthodoxy with a raft of measures
designed to tackle poverty head on.
At the same time, the government
14 Hemisphere Volume 15
Brazil's economics minister Antanio Palocci.
r¢
a
r''
Features
The Lula administration tackles the
challenge of structural change
has embarked on a program of
structural reforms designed to
bring about a step change in sup-
ply-side performance. The Lula
administration is attempting to
tackle ingrained economic prob-
lems while, through the pursuit of
macroeconomic orthodoxy, simul-
taneously seeking to avoid alienat-
ing powerful investor groups. The
major question is whether such a
strategy can be effective given the
contradictions that may exist
between adhering to macroeco-
nomic orthodoxy, on the one hand,
and promoting socially equitable
structural economic reform, on the
other.
Lula's Economic Inheritance
In order to grapple with this
question, a brief review of the char-
acteristics of the Brazilian economy
is essential. Throughout the post-
war period, the economic develop-
ment of Brazil has been marked by
profound instability. After general-
ly impressive growth in the 1950s
under an energetic program of
import substitution industrializa-
tion, by the beginning of the fol-
lowing decade, output had begun
to fall off and inflation to rise.
Without question, the growing
economic instability of this period
was one of the triggers for the mili-
tary coup of 1964. Over the next
two decades, the military fared lit-
tle better than its civilian predeces-
sors in steering the economy onto
a path of long-term sustainable
growth. Brazil enjoyed rapid
growth between 1967 and 1973 as
the result of a substantial industri-
alization and export drive, but this
momentum could not be sustained
into the mid 1970s, when oil price
hikes led to an international reces-
sion. During the boom years,
moreover, social inequality had
increased sharply. By the mid
1980s and the return to civilian
rule, the economy was once again
in profound difficulties as the debt
crisis and hyperinflation took their
toll. Since 1994, a combination of
increased economic openness and a
new monetary policy framework
has done much to dampen infla-
tion; however, growth in the past
five years has proven highly unsta-
ble and the gap between rich and
poor remains wide.
The Fundamental Economic
Challenge
Reviewing this experience, two
essential (and related) features
stand out. First, unlike its newly
industrialized counterparts else-
where (the "Asian Tiger" economies,
for example), Brazil has proven
incapable of delivering steady,
rapid growth. Instead, periods of
boom (frequently lasting no more
than one or two years) are swiftly
followed by periods of bust.
Second, and stemming in part
from the lack of sustained growth,
widespread poverty and inequality
have continued to characterize the
Brazilian economy.
These perennial features of
Brazilian economic life have consti-
tuted a key challenge for policy
makers over the years. More often
than not, however, the need to
generate sustained, equitable
growth has been subordinated to
more immediate objectives, such as
controlling inflation or the external
valuation of the currency.
Macroeconomic fire-fighting,
rather than systemic measures
aimed at promoting equitable
growth, has been the order of the
day. Fortunately, realization has
grown that this approach to eco-
nomic management, akin to tack-
ling symptoms rather than causes,
cannot offer a lasting solution to
Brazil's economic problems. To
this end, policy makers have begun
to focus on the structural con-
straints that impede steady, equi-
table growth.
Of these constraints, the most
obvious are constituted by external
and fiscal deficits. In both cases,
Brazil has historically found it dif-
ficult to realize sustained economic
expansion without the current
account moving sharply into deficit
or the burgeoning government
deficit-through its call on savings
to service existing debt-choking
off resources for further productive
investment. As a result, economic
growth has rarely been able to pro-
ceed steadily and consistently.
Instead, faced with a widening
external deficit and the threat of
currency depreciation and import-
ed inflation, the authorities have,
more often than not, opted to slam
on the brakes by raising interest
rates and reducing public expendi-
ture on all activities not directly
related to debt service.
One of the constraints that most
seriously affects Brazil's growth per-
formance is its poor record on
investment. Particularly over the
past 20 years, Brazil's investment as
a proportion of GDP has tended to
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lag behind that of its main com-
petitors. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, Brazil has had difficulty
matching the growth performance
of, say, South Korea or China. At
the same time, the legacy of under-
investment has imposed capacity
limitations that are soon met once
growth accelerates. This, of course,
contributes to the stop-go pattern
of growth. The reasons underpin-
ning Brazil's subdued investment
performance are complex; however,
two factors stand out: the absorp-
tion of scarce domestic savings into
non-productive public sector
spending, and structural deficien-
cies in domestic capital markets.
Another fundamental structural
constraint is poor productivity
growth in the Brazilian economy.
One of the secrets of the success of
the East Asian Tiger economies was
their efficient use of capital and
labor resources during their rise to
prominence. This enabled them to
deliver far higher growth-and
ultimately higher living stan-
dards-than would otherwise have
been possible. Central to this
achievement was a determination
to invest in education, a commit-
ment that not only facilitated the
development and adoption of effi-
cient management techniques but
also made the workforce more pro-
ductive. Unfortunately, Brazil's
efforts to improve productivity-or
to invest in human capital through
education-have not matched
those of its competitors in Asia and
elsewhere, despite the fact that
Brazilian industry has been forced
to improve its competitiveness in
response to the trade liberalization
initiated in the late 1980s.
The final constraint-and one
explicitly connected to the issue of
social equity-concerns the degree
to which the economic growth that
has been achieved has had differen-
tial impacts upon the rich and
poor. Throughout the postwar
period, one of the central features
of the Brazilian economy has been
the unequal division of the fruits of
growth and development. Many
factors help account for this imbal-
ance, including the skewed nature
of public spending (disproportion-
ately favoring the salaried middle
classes) and the highly uneven pre-
existing distribution of assets, espe-
cially land. As a result, significant
sectors of the population have been
largely bypassed by the improved
income and living standards that
have benefited other groups. While
clearly undesirable from any pro-
gressive normative standpoint, the
existence of such widespread pover-
ty, through its malign impacts on
productivity and participation in
the formal economy, acts in itself
as a limit on growth potential.
Thus, it can be argued, alleviating
poverty and inequality is justified
not only in altruistic terms but also
in terms of its potential to raise
economic performance.
The Policy Response
The Lula administration has
been quick to grasp the importance
of tackling these structural con-
straints. Indeed, their removal
now forms a fundamental plank of
the government's economic strate-
gy. The government has attempt-
ed, as did the preceding Cardoso
administration, to improve the per-
formance of public sector accounts
by reducing the social security
deficit through structural and indi-
rect tax reform. The goal is to cre-
ate more space for spending on
much needed investment projects
and poverty alleviation. So far,
however, the reforms have had only
limited effects, while high interest
rates have increased debt servicing
expenditures.
Concerned about the historical
tendency of the current account
balance to move into the red once
the economy picks up speed, the
Lula administration has launched a
series of initiatives aimed at boost-
ing export performance. The most
important of these provide
increased export financing. The
administration also has made stren-
uous efforts to improve market
access for Brazilian exporters, not
least by pursuing trade deals with
China and other East Asian
economies. On the face of it, the
government's export promotion
drive appears to be working, at
least if trade balance figures are
used as a measure of success.
Between 2003 and 2004, Brazil's
full-year trade surplus increased
from US$24.8 billion to US$33.7
billion. Of course, it should be
stressed that Brazil, with its huge
natural comparative advantages in
natural resource-based goods, is
faring very well from the current
boom in global industrial com-
modity prices, in particular those
for iron ore, steel and other metal-
lic products. The question is
whether the government's initia-
tives will be sufficient to support
other areas of export activity once
the commodities boom subsides, as
it is expected to do in the course of
2005. On this score, the outlook
is uncertain. While Brazil has
developed substantial competitive
advantages in certain higher value-
added exports (automotive prod-
ucts and jet aircraft, in particular)
the picture in other sectors is less
favorable.
Any widespread improvement in
export performance will of course
partly depend on addressing the
productivity constraint identified
earlier. Here again, the prospects
for success are uncertain. By con-
tinuing the relatively open trading
regime of its predecessor, the cur-
rent government will ensure that
adequate competitive pressure is
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placed on enterprises to maintain
the incentive for productivity per-
formance. However, with rates of
productivity growth in competitor
countries tending to outpace those
of Brazil (and from a higher base),
government policy must promote
more substantial improvements in
performance. So far, the indicators
are relatively encouraging. The
Lula administration is committed
to promoting more intensive
research and development within
enterprises while offering financing
initiatives to support fixed capital
investment. The latter develop-
ment should in time lead to the
introduction of upgraded capital
equipment with favorable conse-
quences for productivity. Turning
to the issue of investment more
broadly, the government has taken
a bold step toward improving avail-
ability of capital through a new
bankruptcy law (approved in
December 2004). Its streamlined
insolvency procedures may lower
interest rates for borrowers, but
high domestic interest rates and the
continued heavy absorption of
domestic savings into public sector
debt servicing are likely to place
constraints on the ability of invest-
ment to expand.
Undoubtedly the most politically
sensitive constraint concerns pover-
ty and inequality. In the 2002
election campaign, Lula and his
Workers' Party did much to ensure
popular support by committing
themselves to a program of social
reform and poverty alleviation.
The central elements of this plat-
form were improved investment in
primary education and a series of
direct poverty reduction initiatives
which have come to be known as
Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and
Bolsa Famlia (Family Grant).
These initiatives, which were intro-
duced in 2003, involve a range of
measures, including the provision
of food cards for needy families
and investment in social infrastruc-
ture in deprived communities.
While broadly welcomed at home
and abroad, the initiatives soon ran
into practical problems that
stemmed not only from flaws in
their design but also from funding
shortfalls. The fiscal constraints
that have restricted the extent of
the anti-poverty programs have also
limited the government's efforts to
raise investment in primary educa-
tion, a major target of the reform-
ers. As a result, frustration has
grown among Lula's core support-
ers that the rhetoric of crusading
social reform and poverty allevia-
tion is running ahead of the reality.
The Way Ahead
The funding problems accompa-
nying official efforts to tackle
poverty (and to invest elsewhere to
remove other constraints on
growth) illustrate a certain tension
at the heart of the current govern-
ment's agenda. On the one hand,
the government is anxious not to
unsettle investors. For this reason,
it has adopted strict IMF-agreed
fiscal targets while retaining a tight,
counter-inflationary monetary poli-
cy. Without question, these poli-
cies have been successful to the
extent that inflation has remained
in check and growth (which is esti-
mated at 5% for 2004) has
rebounded from a dismal perform-
ance in 2003. On the other hand,
the government's macroeconomic
stance is limiting its ability to tack-
le the structural constraints that
ultimately need to be overcome if
growth is to be sustained well into
the future. This limitation takes
on a number of concrete forms.
The pursuit of tight fiscal policy in
itself reduces the scope for invest-
ing in such areas as education,
poverty alleviation and export pro-
motion. When combined with
high interest rates (which increased
yet again in the final quarter of
2004) the fiscal limitation is all the
greater, since high debt-servicing
costs can tend to squeeze out other
public expenditures. At the same
time, the high interest rates dis-
courage private investment proj-
ects. Tackling the investment con-
straint, therefore, becomes increas-
ingly difficult.
Of course, it should not be sug-
gested that orthodox macroeco-
nomic policies are keeping the Lula
government from making progress
on its structural constraint agenda.
Real signs of change are evident;
however, the gravity of the struc-
tural problems facing the economy
(especially as regards poverty)
means that more rapid and con-
certed action is needed. If this
opportunity is lost, then the cur-
rent improvement in Brazil's eco-
nomic fortunes is likely to be, as so
often in the past, only a blip. U
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Rethinking Foreign Investment
by Roy C. Nelson
T raditionally, Brazil'sWorkers' Party (PT)and its leader, current
president Luiz Inicio
("Lula") da Silva, were
characterized by a somewhat antago-
nistic stance toward foreign invest-
ment and capitalism in general. Yet
during the presidential campaign of
2002, and after taking office in
2003, Lula moderated his position.
Lula now actively promotes foreign
investment and strives constantly to
reassure the foreign business com-
munity of Brazil's suitability as a
place to invest its capital. Why did
this happen? This article examines
the ways political experience at the
sub-national level has shaped the
PT's national policies since 2003.
Background
In the 1970s, as a leader of the
Metalworkers' Union of Sao
Bernardo do Campo, a suburb of
Sao Paulo where automobile firms
such as Volkswagen, Mercedes and
Ford had large plants, Lula led
strikes against foreign firms and
denounced their actions with fiery,
radical rhetoric. As one of the
founders of the socialist PT in 1980
and as the PT candidate for presi-
dent in 1989, 1994 and 1998, Lula
spoke out against privatization,
promising to put a stop to the sale
of Brazil's state-owned firms to for-
eign investors.
In his successful campaign for
president in 2002, however, Lula's
position on this issue changed. He
adopted a much more moderate
stance. During the campaign, Lula
went out of his way to reassure for-
eign investors. He even traveled to
New York to speak with institutional
money managers and Wall Street
investment bankers about his views,
assuring them that, if elected, he
would implement investor-friendly
policies.
Since taking office in January
2003, Lula has kept these promises.
Signaling his rapprochement with
the business community, he
appointed prominent executives to
key posts in his government.
Henrique Meirelles, president of
BankBoston, took over as head of
the Central Bank, and Luiz Furlan,
owner and chairman of the board of
Sadia Corporation, a giant Brazilian
frozen foods company, became min-
ister of development, industry and
trade. Lula also enacted a reform of
Brazil's pension plan that put the
country on a much sounder footing
financially. He promised to main-
tain the agreement that his predeces-
sor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
had signed with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and his
administration has adhered faithfully
to its guidelines. More specifically
with regard to foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), Lula continued plans
begun during the previous adminis-
tration for Brazil to create a nation-
al-level investment promotion
agency, Investe Brasil.
All of these actions confirmed to
the business community in general,
and to foreign investors in particu-
lar, that Lula had thoroughly
changed his views on foreign invest-
ment. Brazil was rewarded with an
improvement in its investment grade
from rating agencies such as
Standard and Poor's and Moody's, a
key indicator for prospective
investors of a country's financial sta-
bility and overall investment climate.
What caused Lulas views on for-
eign investment to change so rapid-
ly? The practical realities of being in
government, rather than outside of
it, and Lulas determination to prove
that the PT could be effective at
running the country were important
factors. But the experiences of
Olivio Dutra, who as governor of
the southern state of Rio Grande do
Sul from 1999-2003 was one of the
party's highest elected officials until
Lula took office, also provided les-
sons for the PT about the benefits-
both political and economic-of
foreign direct investment from
transnational corporations. The
story of Dutra and the PT in Rio
Grande do Sul speaks volumes about
how parties and politicians can learn
from their perceived mistakes.
Setting the Stage: Britto's Efforts
to Attract FDI
Dutra's predecessor as governor of
Rio Grande do Sul, the centrist
Ant6nio Britto (1995-1999), had a
vision of turning Brazil's southern-
most state into an attractive location
for manufacturing. It is common
practice for many of Brazil's 26
states to use reductions in their state
sales tax and other incentives to
compete for FDI. Seeking to lure
FDI away from the more prosper-
ous, industrialized and densely pop-
ulated state of Sao Paulo, Britto
offered generous incentives to per-
suade large transnational corpora-
tions to establish manufacturing
plants in his state. By the time
Britto ran for re-election in 1998,
General Motors and other firms had
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Lessons from the PT government
in Rio Grande do Sul
a4
Olivio Dutra, governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2003).
already established major plants in
Rio Grande do Sul. Ford Motor
Corporation and Dell Computer
had signed contracts with the Britto
government guaranteeing specific
incentives and were preparing to
begin construction on plants of their
own.
To the chagrin of these executives,
Britto lost the election. The winner
was Dutra, the PT candidate and
one of the parry's founders. Dutra
had campaigned in part on a plat-
form to discontinue the incentives
offered to large transnational corpo-
rations, including Ford and Dell.
The executives' concerns were justi-
fied: Upon taking office, Dutra pro-
ceeded to follow through on his
rhetoric, announcing that he would
rescind Britto's agreements with the
companies.
The Ford Fiasco
Executives at Ford attempted to
renegotiate with Dutra, but to no
avail. Standing by his position
regarding the incentives, Dutra
refused even to meet with them.
After several thwarted attempts to
negotiate, the Ford executives gave
up. Since they had not yet begun
construction on the manufacturing
plant planned for the town of
Guaiba, near the state capital of
Porto Alegre, they began to consider
alternative locations within Brazil.
The state of Bahia emerged as a
viable alternative. Officials there,
determined to win Ford's investment
for their state in the impoverished
northeastern region of Brazil, offered
incentives identical to those the
Britto administration had promised.
Another plus was a federal govern-
ment program that gave special
incentives to automobile manufac-
turers locating their plants in Brazil's
northeast.
Another strong point in Bahia's
favor was the fact that Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes, then president of
Brazil's Senate and one of the coun-
try's most influential politicians at
the time, was from the state. His
party, the Partido da Frente Liberal
(PFL), was a key partner in President
Cardoso's governing coalition. With
his enormous clout, Magalhaes was
able to persuade Congress to modify
the legislation on incentives for man-
ufacturing automobiles in the north-
east so that Ford could take advan-
tage of it, even though the deadline
for companies to participate had
passed.
The federal government approved
additional incentives to make up for
the extra costs Ford would face by
building its plant in Bahia instead of
the more conveniently located Rio
Grande do Sul. Brazil's national
development bank, Banco Nacional
de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e
Social (BNDES), offered Ford a low-
interest loan of more than US$300
million after the company
announced it was moving to Bahia.
This was far more than it had
planned to give for Ford's investment
in Rio Grande do Sul.
Too late, Dutra realized that Ford
was about to pull out of Rio Grande
do Sul and go to Bahia instead.
Aware of the negative political conse-
quences that could ensue, he
attempted to negotiate with the Ford
executives. But Ford had already
decided to withdraw from Rio
Grande do Sul, and the company
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soon signed a contract with the
Bahian state government.
Ford's departure was a political dis-
aster for Dutra. Residents of
Guafba, the town where the plant
was to have been located, protested
against the governor. Editorials and
articles in the press attacked Dutra
for his actions. Naturally, Dutra's
political opponents emphasized the
negative impact the lost jobs would
have on Rio Grande do Sul.
Dutra Changes His Stance
Not wanting to lose another major
investment, Dutra took a different
approach when Dell executives
approached him to renegotiate their
incentives package. Britto had
promised Dell generous incentives to
attract its proposed US$108 million
plant: a 75% reduction in the state
income tax for 12 years and a US$17
million loan, to be paid back over 10
years with a five-year grace period.
Facing the loss of these incentives,
Dell considered following Ford's
example and locating its plant else-
where. Other states were ready and
willing to receive Dell's investment
on highly favorable terms. Despite
these offers, however, and Ford's
failed attempts to renegotiate with
Dutra, local Brazilian executives
working for Dell decided to
approach the governor again.
Dell's director of corporate affairs
in Brazil, Fernando Loureiro, devised
a face-saving strategy for the gover-
nor to allow Dell to keep its incen-
tives. When Loureiro and his team
met with the governor, they made
the case that Dell was not a typical
transnational corporation. Personal
computers, the products Dell pro-
duced, were beneficial to society,
they argued. Computers allowed use
of the Internet, which provided peo-
ple of all social strata with access to
information. Thus, Dell's products
would actually help to create a more
egalitarian social structure. Dell's
goals and those of the PT governor
were actually closely aligned,
Loureiro insisted. While it might
make sense not to offer incentives to
companies such as Ford, he contin-
ued, Dell was different.
Dutra had already experienced the
ire of the gaucho population first-
hand after Ford decided to locate its
plant in Bahia, so political calcula-
tions may have influenced his actions
at this point. But whether persuaded
by Loureiro's reasoning, motivated
purely by political factors, or some
mixture of both, Dutra decided to let
Dell keep all of the original incen-
tives the previous governor had
offered with only minor conditions.
Dell stayed. And in many of his
public speeches thereafter, Dutra
used Dell as an example of the sort
of company his government would
like to attract to Rio Grande do Sul.
Despite this new approach, the
Dutra government still had difficulty
luring investment to the state in the
years that followed Ford's departure.
Few transnational corporations were
willing to invest in a state whose gov-
ernor seemed at the very least to have
an ambivalent attitude toward FDI,
and where the rules regarding foreign
investment could change so quickly.
The Lessons from Rio Grande
do Sul
The PT could not help but absorb
the painful and well-publicized les-
sons of Dutra's experience in Rio
Grande do Sul. As governor of a
major state, Dutra held one of the
few major offices the PT had cap-
tured up until that time, but his
rigid, ideologically driven stance
toward Ford, and Ford's subsequent
withdrawal of its proposed manufac-
turing plant from Rio Grande do
Sul, contributed to make him hugely
unpopular. It helped explain why
Dutra lost the internal party primary
to run for re-election in 2002 and
why the candidate finally selected to
represent the PT in that race, Tarso
Genro, eventually lost to a relatively
unknown politician from the more
moderate Party of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (PMDB).
The PT's decline in Rio Grande do
Sul continued in October 2004
when the party lost control of the
capital city, Porto Alegre (home to
the World Social Forum), for the
first time since 1988.
The lessons of Dutra's rapid
decline were discussed widely in the
media, in business and political cir-
cles, and especially within the PT
itself. To a certain extent, the state
government of Rio Grande do Sul
had been the PT's showcase at the
sub-national level, a dress rehearsal
for how the party might behave if
and when it finally achieved national
power. A longstanding fear of the
domestic and international business
communities was that a PT national
government would be hostile to for-
eign investment. This fear was con-
firmed in Rio Grande do Sul by
Dutra's aggressive and ultimately
counterproductive confrontation
with Ford. Within the PT, the con-
sensus among Lula's advisors was that
if the party were to have a serious
shot at winning the presidential elec-
tion in 2002, it would have to adopt
a more pragmatic and moderate
stance toward FDI.
Many factors explain Lula's shift to
a more pragmatic approach regarding
foreign investment. But the PT's
experiences in sub-national govern-
ment are certainly a large part of the
story. Without a doubt, the harsh
lessons that Dutra, and the PT itself,
learned firsthand in Rio Grande do
Sul were among the most important
reasons for this change. U
Roy C. Nelson is associate professor of
international studies at Thunderbird,
the Garvin School ofInternational
Management.
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Facing the Past
by James N. Green
Brazil's return to demo-
cratic rule has been a
rough roller coaster ride.
Spiraling inflation in the
late 1980s and early 1990s dove-
tailed with the impeachment of
Fernando Collor, the country's first
directly elected president since 1960.
Two-term President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) held
down price increases and stepped up
the integration of the Brazilian econ-
omy into the global market, but his
popular support waned during his
final years in office. In late 2002,
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva came to the
presidency with widespread backing
from the popular classes and the
enthusiastic expectations of his left-
wing political base. His administra-
tion, however, has become embroiled
in controversy about the lingering
legacy of the military regime. A
national debate has emerged about
whether the excesses of the military
dictatorship merit further investiga-
tion or should be laid to rest. The
outcome may be a test of the extent
to which democracy is firmly rooted
in Brazil.
Solidarity in the States
Few people realize that the con-
certed campaigns in the United
States to defend human rights in
Latin America over the last three
decades grew in large part out of a
modest effort initiated in the late
1960s by Brazilians seeking interna-
tional allies to inform the world of
the deteriorating situation in their
country after the military coup of
April 1, 1964. Instrumental in this
effort was a meeting between a small
Archives, torturers and the legacies
of dictatorship
group of Brazilian exiles and William
Wipfler, then assistant director of the
Latin American Department of the
National Council of Churches.
In December 1969, Jether Pereira
Ramalho, a lay leader in the
Brazilian Congregationalist Church,
and his wife, Lucilia, traveled to New
York. Upon arrival, they went
directly to meet Wipfler at an office
building on Riverside Drive, next to
the imposing neo-Gothic church
that dominates the neighborhood.
There they were greeted by Jovelino
Ramos, a Presbyterian minister from
Rio de Janeiro who left Brazil in
1968 after being indicted for alleged
subversive activities. He was accom-
panied by an old friend, Ruben
Cdsar Fernandes, who had gone into
exile in the mid 1960s and recently
enrolled at Columbia University to
complete his doctorate in history.
Domicio Pereira, a Congregationalist
minister from Rio de Janeiro, was
also present. The warm embraces
and jovial atmosphere so common
when old friends reunite, however,
was undercut by the serious tone of
the occasion. A simple but signifi-
cant plan was in the making.
Discretely, Ramalho and Pereira
had brought with them to the
United States a collection of docu-
ments detailing the fates of hundreds
of Brazilian political prisoners. Item
by item, they turned over the materi-
al to Wipfler for his examination.
Many years later, the Episcopal cleric
recalled looking at the denunciations
for the first time: "Several were
scrawled on scraps of filthy paper,
paper bags or wrinkled envelopes,
and were difficult to decipher.
Another was transcribed in minute
lettering on a single square of toilet
paper; reading it required a magnify-
ing glass...I knew things were bad in
Brazil, but I hadn't seen anything in
writing, any texts. [Ramalho and
Pereira] brought with them individ-
ual and group testimonies."
Among the material the two had
smuggled out of Brazil was a state-
ment drafted earlier that month by
16 female political prisoners at a
detention center on an island in Rio
de Janeiro harbor. The document
boldly declared: "We have written
this letter from where we are impris-
oned on the Ilha das Flores in Rio de
Janeiro. Only now is information
starting to trickie out about the
atrocities that have been committed
against political prisoners in our
country; thus, the Brazilian public
may still doubt that these criminal
acts are really taking place. We can
assure everyone that TORTURE
DOES EXIST IN BRAZIL." The
document then named the 16 female
prisoners and detailed their treat-
ment, describing beatings, electric
shock and other forms of torture.
Shaken by what he had read and
determined to help, Wipfler immedi-
ately invited the Brazilians to set up
operations in a vacant office at the
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WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT
We cannot remain silent in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the flagrant denial of human
rights and dignity coeing to us from Brazil. This dossier is but a fraction of that evidence. Signi-
ficantly, several documents were written by Brazllians and smuggled out of grazil at great risk to those
involved. They accepted the possible penalties in order to inform the people of the world of the fact
that terror and torture are used in their country as instruments of government.
We cannot remain silent. To do so would make us accomplices of those who are the authors and
perpetrators of this repression. We call upon the readers of this dossier to raise their voices is pro-
test with us.
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director of the US Catholic
Conference's Latin American Bureau,
and his successor, Thomas Quigley,
soon joined these efforts, playing a
leading role in keeping the issue alive
in Washington.
Over the next several years a loose-
ly knit but broad-based network of
clerics, academics, political exiles and
activists carried out a series of cam-
paigns to educate the American pub-
lic about the serious violation of
human rights in Brazil and the US
government's tacit support for the
military regime. They sought sup-
port from leading clergy, academics
and other prominent figures for a
National Council of Churches. For
the next two months they organized
the material that Ramalho and
Pereira had brought from Brazil,
indexing the denunciations and
preparing a complete dossier that
could be published in English and
distributed in the United States.
Wipfler also put the group in contact
with Ralph Della Cava, a professor
of Brazilian and Latin American his-
tory at Queens College who, along
with American University Professor
Brady Tyson, had been working
behind the scenes in the United
States against the Brazilian dictator-
ship. Louis M. Colonnese, then
public statement, "We Cannot
Remain Silent," that condemned the
Brazilian government's treatment of
political prisoners. In April 1970,
Latin American specialists at the
Second National Conference of the
Latin American Studies Association
(LASA) in Washington, D.C., passed
a stinging resolution condemning
torture in Brazil. Representatives of
the National Council of Churches
and the US Catholic Conference
presented a thick dossier to the
Inter-American Human Rights
Commission of the Organization of
American States in June of that year
requesting that the international
agency conduct an on-site investiga-
tion into human rights abuses. In
December 1971, when General and
President Emilio G. Mddici visited
President Richard Nixon in
Washington, activists organized a
protest in front of the White House.
Reports from Brazil and consistent
campaigning in the United States
influenced strong editorial positions
in the New York Times and the
Washington Post against the Brazilian
generals in power. Brazil was no
longer simply the land of parrots,
Amazonian rain forest and Carnival;
it had also become the land of tor-
ture.
The campaign in the United States
to denounce the repressive measures
of the Brazilian military government
proved to be a valuable experience
for those who took up the cause of
human rights in Chile after the
armed forces of that country, led by
Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the
democratically elected government of
Dr. Salvador Allende in 1973.
Whereas hundreds of concerned
individuals in the United States had
mobilized against human rights vio-
lations in Brazil, thousands became
involved in a multitude of campaigns
throughout the country to denounce
the arrest, execution and disappear-
ance of progressive political activists
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in Chile. The Watergate scandals
and the widespread questioning of
US foreign policy initiatives in the
wake of the Vietnam War laid the
groundwork for the introduction of
new legislation limiting foreign aid
to countries that violated their citi-
zens' human rights. In 1976, Jimmy
Carter's presidential campaign was
based in part on his call for a new
foreign policy that privileged human
rights over other geopolitical consid-
erations.
Opening the Archives
Parallel to the expansion of the
international human rights move-
ment, efforts toward democratization
gained momentum in Brazil.
Although the promise of civilian rule
took another 10 years to be fulfilled,
government-initiated gestures favor-
ing a loosening of military control
accelerated in 1974 after the opposi-
tion party trounced its pro-military
rival in Congressional elections. As
part of the many accords reached to
guarantee a safe exit strategy for the
armed forces and avoid a revanchist
reckoning with Brazil's torturers, the
Brazilian Congress passed an
Amnesty Act in 1979. This bill ben-
efited approximately 4,500 political
prisoners and exiles, but excluded
many leftist activists found guilty of
murder, kidnapping or other violent
acts. It also exempted from criminal
prosecution those involved in the
torture or disappearance of members
of the opposition.
In 1985, only months after a
return to civilian rule, the Brazilian
Catholic Church published an
exhaustive dossier entitled Brasil:
Nunca Mais (Brazil Never Again)
that documented the forms of tor-
ture and repression carried out dur-
ing the 21 years that the generals
were in power. Five years later, a
journalist reported the discovery of
an unmarked mass grave of govern-
ment opponents. These revelations
sparked public outrage and renewed
pressure to hold the military
accountable for the crimes of the
recent past. Brazilian human rights
groups, including the Commission
of Relatives of the Dead and the
Disappeared, pressed the government
to conduct further investigations into
the final fate of many activists who
had died or disappeared over the pre-
vious two decades. During the
Cardoso administration, the 1995
Law of the Disappeared authorized a
special commission to investigate
these deaths. The Commission's
report documented the torture and
murder of hundreds of activists, but
the 1979 Amnesty Law precluded
prosecution for human rights abuses.
At the same time, state governments
began to declassify and open to the
public millions of political police
files that contained extensive infor-
mation about the national security
methods employed during the mili-
tary regime. Researchers who have
consulted these political police
records remain acutely aware that
many other archives of the different
government agencies involved in
repressive measures have remained
sealed.
In late 2004, 30 years after
Brazilian journalist Vladimir Herzog
died in military custody, a military
intelligence agent leaked a pair of
previously unknown photographs
alleged to have been taken only
hours before Herzog supposedly
hanged himself. The journalist's
death in 1975 had sparked unprece-
dented protests and contributed to
strengthening the movement against
the military regime. The agent who
supplied the photographs claimed
that the armed forces continued
secretly to spy on left-wing activists,
unions and other social movements
for many years after the military
relinquished power in 1985.
Representatives of the armed forces
insisted that files from the years of
political repression had been duly
destroyed in the 1980s, yet in
January 2005 more documents, sup-
posedly burned years ago, reap-
peared.
Nongovernmental organizations
such as Tortura, Nunca Mais
(Torture Never Again) are demand-
ing that all of the archives of the dif-
ferent intelligence agencies of the
armed forces be turned over to the
National Archive or another public
entity so that friends and relatives
can finally learn the truth about the
whereabouts of the disappeared.
Scholars working on the period of
the military dictatorship stress that
without full access to the armed
forces' archives an exhaustive analysis
of the country's recent history will be
impossible. The Brazilian Historical
Association has gone on record
protesting an executive order issued
in late 2002 extending the classifica-
tion of many official documents for
an additional 30 to 50 years. The
Lula administration, which contains
many individuals who were victims
of repression between 1964 and
1985, has pledged its commitment
to uncovering the hidden secrets of
the military regime. Whether it will
have the political will to confront the
armed forces in this matter remains
to be seen.
James N. Green is associate professor
of Brazilian history and culture at
Brown University and chair of the
Committee on the Future of Brazilian
Studies in the United States. He is
currently completing a book entitled
"'We Cannot Remain Silent:'
Opposition to the Brazilian Military
Dictatorship in the United States,
1964-85."
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Learning with Brazil and Lula
by Tanya Dawkins
N ot since the electionof South Africa'sNelson Mandela and
Poland's Lech Walesa
has a new leader
generated such interest, hope and
expectation as Brazilian President
Luiz Inicio "Lula" da Silva. In
2003, the newly elected Lula elec-
trified the overflow crowd in Porto
Alegre at his first World Social
Forum address. His victory seemed
to be a concrete affirmation of the
forum's mantra, "Another World is
Possible." That was then. At the
2005 World Social Forum, new
parties, including the Party of
Socialism and Liberty (P-SOL),
founded by dissidents from Lula's
Workers' Party (PT) in 2004, spon-
sored loud protests just outside
Porto Alegre's Gigantinho Stadium.
Hecklers inside couldn't drown out
the largely supportive crowd, but
the joy, tears, hope and adoration
that washed over the 2003 audience
was replaced by the bated breath of
supporters who seemed to have
come to hear Lula say something,
anything that would make it all
make sense.
The Politics: Is Compromise the
"Gift" that Keeps on Giving?
Candidates are prone to speak in
superlatives, and Lula was no
exception. To the markets he
promised macroeconomic stability
and spectacular growth; to Brazil's
working class and unemployed he
promised 10 million jobs and dou-
ble the minimum wage in four
years; and to the landless he prom-
ised "more land than they could
occupy." He courageously
acknowledged Brazil's need for
racial justice.
The PT's campaign decision to
gain power by moving toward the
political center has led to an ava-
lanche of compromises that have
tested the party's unity and capacity
to move its agenda forward. Lula's
early decision to maintain the eco-
nomic team and many of the eco-
nomic policies of his predecessor,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was
an immediate source of contradic-
tion and controversy. Brazil's inter-
est rates are among the highest in
the world and the country's pri-
mary surplus exceeds International
Monetary Fund (IMF) require-
ments. The tight monetary policies
of Economics Minister Ant6nio
Palocci and Central Bank President
Henrique Meirelles may have won
the hearts and minds of investors,
but advocates for domestic social
and economic investments are call-
ing for their replacement.
The PT's enviably progressive
record of governance at the subna-
tional level has not translated easily
to the federal level. In a cruel
irony, the PT lost two strategic and
symbolic elections in 2004: in
Porto Alegre, known around the
world for pioneering participatory
budgeting and hosting the World
Social Forum, and in Sao Paulo,
the industrial capital and South
America's largest city.
Since 2003, Lula's personal
approval ratings have remained
consistently high. Yet the PT does
not have a majority in either cham-
ber of Congress. Each legislative
initiative requires major negotiation
and alliance building. The opposi-
tion Social Democratic Party
(PSDB), for example, is a likely ally
for social security reform but not
necessarily for progressive land
reform. Growing fissures between
Lula's supporters and groups frus-
trated with the pace of change
recently cost the PT the leadership
of the Chamber of Deputies. In
February 2005, this pivotal seat,
which determines which bills reach
the floor for debate and when, went
to a conservative former supporter
of the 1964-1985 military regime,
Severino Cavalcanti. For the first
time, emerging schisms within the
PT led to a major political defeat.
The Geopolitics: Brazil's Star
Shines on the World Stage
Lula, along with his tireless for-
eign minister, Celso Amorim, has
revitalized Brazil's presence in the
international arena. Rubens
Barbosa, Brazil's former ambassador
to the US, points to the breadth
and sophistication of Brazil's global
agenda-reinvigorating MERCO-
SUR; shepherding the South
American Community of Nations;
forging economic ties with India,
China, Russia, South Africa and the
Middle East; and, in general,
increasing the Brazilian presence in
the world. In two years, Brazil's
trade deficit has become a US$32
billion surplus, including an 80%
(US$4.5 billion) increase with
China. Cecilia Alemany from the
Association of Latin American
Development Organizations
(ALOP) credits Lula with redefin-
ing the very concept of Latin
America by focusing on building
South America's strength and
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The politics and geopolitics of social
and economic justice
Another world is possible. Every region, coun-
try and community struggles with Brazil's
questions within its own unique political and
historical context. It is oddly fitting that
Brazil should be on the leading edge of what it
means to get from here to there.
capacity as a region. The G20, a
Brazilian-led South-South alliance
that includes India, China,
Argentina and South Africa,
brought the September 2003 World
Trade Organization (WTO) talks to
a standstill over the issue of agricul-
tural subsidies. Nine months later,
at the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) meeting, Brazil hosted the
negotiating session that broke the
impasse.
"Sometimes, I don't think
Brazilians fully appreciate how
Brazil's leadership is changing the
world," says Hazel Henderson,
author of Building a Win-Win
World: Life Beyond Global Economic
Warfare. Henderson cites numer-
ous examples, including the fact
that 600 of the 2000 corporate sig-
natories to the United Nations
Global Compact are Brazilian.
Judy Morrison, director of the
Washington-based Inter-American
Consultation on Race, points to
Brazil's sponsorship of the Inter-
American Commission on Human
Rights' Special Rapporteurship on
People of African Descent in the
Americas as a pioneering govern-
ment initiative at the international
level.
Complexity and Contradictions
Yet for all the diplomatic and
economic dividends, the domestic
social agenda is languishing.
Unemployment remains high.
Flagship programs such as Zero
Hunger (Fome Zero) and the Family
Grant (Bolsa Familia) have been
plagued by slow startups, inade-
quate funding and poor manage-
ment.
Sociologist and Lula critic James
Petras recently wrote a scathing
essay entitled, "Brazil: Deepening
and Extending NeoLiberalism -
Year Two." Petras contends that
exponential increases in soybean
and meat exports fuel rain forest
deforestation while resources for
environmental protection are
declining. "This strategy locks
Brazil into a new cycle of depend-
ence on raw material production,
further distorting development pat-
terns," he writes. In a rebuttal,
Lula ally and AFL-CIO Americas
Program Director Stan Gacek con-
tends that such critiques are unfair,
premature, and miss what he calls
the "left-wing of the possible."
Gacek points to Lula's success in
advancing public interest industrial
policy, foreign policy and trade in
"distinct opposition to the undis-
puted hegemony of the North and
its multinational interests." He also
praises unprecedented levels of pub-
lic participation in Brazilian politi-
cal life.
"Yes, there is more participation,
but...," says Iara Pietricovsky,
director of the Center for
Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) in
Brasilia, who notes that the real
work is linking increased participa-
tion with accountability and
realigning economic policy and
spending. Commissions and con-
sultative processes abound, but
financial resources for education,
health, housing and land reform are
in much shorter supply. Groups
like INESC and Inter-Redes, a
coalition of 42 Brazilian networks
representing indigenous and land-
less groups, Brazilians of African
descent, environmental and human
rights associations, see democratiz-
ing the budget-making process as a
key political and organizing strategy
for shifting priorities and are press-
ing for a number of reforms,
including making the budget
process electronically accessible to
the public.
Race and Land: Heavy Lifting
Brazil's stunningly unequal land
distribution is an enduring symbol
of its historical inability to grapple
with inequality. One percent of
Brazil's population controls 50% of
its land. Stung by the slow pace of
land settlements and growing vio-
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lence against land rights activists,
groups like the Landless Rural
Workers Movement (MST) that
supported Lula's election are turn-
ing up the heat. Rather than break
with the government, they have
carved out a policy called apoio
critico (critical support). Critical
support keeps the channels of com-
munication open but sets the stage
for stepped-up land occupations,
direct action and other measures of
external pressure.
Like land reform, Brazil's racial
inequality remains a major chal-
lenge. Lula's government has raised
the profile of issues of race and
social inclusion by creating the
Special Secretariat for the
Promotion of Racial Equality (SEP-
PIR) to coordinate race-conscious
policies across government; launch-
ing Diversidade, a national public
awareness campaign; and beginning
efforts to diversify Brazil's elite
diplomatic corps. But Dr. Silvio
Cunha, economist and co-founder
of the Instituto Cultural Steve Biko
in Salvador, points out that,
"Legislative initiatives such as Law
10639-which promotes affirma-
tive action in higher education and
the teaching of African and Afro-
Brazilian history in schools-are
undoubtedly important, "but the
passage of stalled measures like the
Statute of Racial Equality is needed
to consolidate policies that advance
the interests of Brazil's majority
Afro-descendant population and
deal with racism at a structural
level."
Learning with Lula
Lula's cautious overtures to capi-
tal markets and his progressive
base's learning curve about its new
role as friend of the president has
cost precious momentum and
sowed the seeds of cynicism and
disappointment. "I cannot accept
the permanence of everything I
condemned throughout my entire
life," explains PT militant and his-
torian Sergio Lamario. "People say
that Lula's mandate is the third
term of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. Unfortunately, I have to
agree with them." Others think it
is too early to give up on Lula.
"What will happen has yet to be
decided," cautions Eduardo
Siqueira, a Brazilian scholar and
activist at the University of
Massachusetts-Lowell who advo-
cates a posture of "support with
struggle."
Lesson #1: Models and Multipliers
Matter. Whether Lula's early eco-
nomic decisions were necessary
evils or just evils remains the sub-
ject of debate. By privileging
export growth and foreign invest-
ment over domestic social and eco-
nomic reforms, however, he has
deepened the very model he cam-
paigned against. "Good economic
policy must generate something
more than money for corpora-
tions," notes Dr. Luiza Bairros,
director of the Race and
Democracy Project at the Federal
University of Bahia and former
leader of Brazil's United Black
Movement.
Lula's current economic model
rests on the risky assumption that
growth will create the domestic
political will to distribute gains
more equitably. This will not hap-
pen if traditional power relations
remain unchanged. For example, if
feeding the hungry is not accompa-
nied by a strategy that targets the
structural roots of hunger-i.e.
access to land, capital, productive
capacity-the poor will remain at
the mercy of a model incapable of
prioritizing their interests.
Lesson #2: Inequality Matters.
These disconnects act as powerful
multipliers in the reproduction of
poverty and inequality. Brazil's new
growth in exports and GDP has
yet to show signs of bridging the
country's deep structural inequali-
ties. New incentives and indicators
that assess all areas of economic
activity in terms of their contribu-
tion to addressing inequality are
needed to make participafdo mean-
ingful.
Lesson #3: Movements Matter.
Twenty years after the military
withdrew from power, Brazilians
realize that political democracy is
not economic democracy. Not
even a leader with Lula's credentials
can create and sustain the condi-
tions needed to advance an aggres-
sive agenda for change. Organized
communities, movements and a
dynamic civil society ultimately
provide the accountability and
political space needed to advance
change at multiple levels. The
tremendous resources expended
during national elections often
come at the expense of local organ-
izing and base-building work. This
model leaves far too much to the
winner's popularity or personal
charisma. The MST, Black
Movement and others are raising
the stakes in the hope that
increased organization, mobiliza-
tion and pressure will give Lula the
impetus for an aggressive push in
the remaining two years of his
administration and put Brazil's next
president (whether Lula or not) on
notice. In May 2005, the MST
stepped up its campaign with a 17-
day, 150-mile march on Brasilia.
Twelve thousand small farmers, land-
less rural workers, and their allies
retraced the steps of a previous march
to demand the implementation of
the National Plan for Land Reform
(PNRA). Leaders of Brazil's Black
Movement have reportedly been dis-
cussing a similar mobilization.
Lesson #4: Tough Love Matters.
The struggle over the social and
economic justice agenda in Brazil is
often a fight between "friends."
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Lula's allies are realizing the need
for a new set of skills to win recog-
nition from the government. The
MST's "Critical Support" policy is
just one of many emerging terms of
engagement. The US civil rights
movement and South Africa's anti-
apartheid movement lost critical
momentum during similar
moments. The art and science of
movement-state relations when a
leader with progressive credentials is
in office is still unfolding.
Lesson #5: Ideas Matter. Five
years ago, Brazil gave birth to the
first World Social Forum. In that
short time, the annual event has
grown from 5000 to 175,000 par-
ticipants. The World Social Forum
is the intellectual touchstone of a
new generation of analysts,
activists, NGOs, and progressive
business and movement leaders
who are reclaiming the market,
redefining democracy and rejecting
labels like "protectionist." Proposals
range from new strategies for guar-
anteeing access to health care and
capital to maintaining citizen con-
trol over natural resources and har-
nessing international currency spec-
ulation to fund health and econom-
ic development. "New ideas need
10 to 15 years to take hold. This
new tide of citizen mobilization
round the world is less than 10
years old," notes Candido
Grzybowski, director of the
Brazilian Institute for Social and
Economic Analysis (IBASE) and a
member of the World Social Forum
Organizing Committee.
Another world is possible. Every
region, country and community
struggles with Brazil's questions
within its own unique political and
historical context. It is oddly fit-
ting that Brazil should be on the
leading edge of what it means to
get from here to there. For all its
contradictions and complexities,
the political space that has opened
because of Brazil's leadership and
movements is enviable and impres-
sive. One of Brazil's many gifts to
the world may very well be lessons
that inform and transform the poli-
tics and geopolitics of social and
economic justice. U
Tanya Dawkins (dawkinst@
mindspring.com) is the founder/
director of the Inter-American Forum
and senior vice president of the
Collins Center for Public Policy.
The Forum is a leadership and policy
project working to develop, highlight
and promote new visions of trade and
economic policy that place social equi-
ty, public interest and community at
the center of the public and policy
agenda.
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COMING SOON
FIU Report on "Terrorism Preparedness in Florida"
Dr. Michael W. Collier, Lead Investigator
This two-year field research project by Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center
and Institute for the Study of Transnational Crime and Terrorism investigates the readiness of Florida's first
responders to handle a terrorist attack. Included are an assessment of the security posture of Florida's critical
infrastructure and a statewide telephone poll of Florida citizens about terrorism preparedness issues.
While Florida is often seen as a national leader in emergency readiness programs and is better prepared than
before the 9/11 disasters, the state is far from ready to respond to future attacks. The citizens surveyed for this
project strongly supported terrorism preparedness programs, indicating they would give up more civil liberties
and pay higher taxes to ensure the safety of their families.
To order an advance copy, call the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University,
(305) 348-2894, or email Michael Collier at: collierm@fiu.edu.
Drought and Hope in the Sertao
Photos and text by Ricardo Funari
T he northeastern regionof Brazil known as thesertdo is synonymous
with drought and
poverty for most
Brazilians. In fact, however, its aver-
age annual rainfall is twice that of
productive areas in Arizona and New
Mexico. An underground sea of
fresh water waits to be tapped-
some 4,300 cubic meters of water
per inhabitant. (The United Nations
estimates the region's minimum need
as 2,000 cubic meters per inhabi-
tant.) Huge amounts of water are
also stored in reservoirs.
The technical know-how for chan-
neling and distributing all this water
has been around for decades, and the
financial means to tackle the prob-
lem have always existed. What is
lacking is political will to solve the
problem, an impasse has kept the so-
called drought industry thriving.
Against a background of artificial
scarcity, a few powerful individuals
profit from the poverty of the major-
ity, with paternalism a dominant cul-
tural trait. Illiteracy levels are high in
the sertdo, short-term job prospects
are nil for the overwhelming majori-
ty of the rural population and mal-
nutrition is beginning to spread.
The sertdo is the most populous
semi-arid region in the world. Some
10 million people live in a rural area
that includes 1,209 municipalities in
nine states. To date, no government
has ever taken effective measures
against this historic tragedy, even
though severe droughts strike the
region every 12 to 15 years-the last
one was in 1998-1999-and moder-
ate drought conditions are nearly
always a problem. Scientists recently
correlated these cycles with El Nino,
which typically causes floods in the
south of the country and fires in the
north.
A project that would substantially
alleviate the effects of drought in the
northeast has been gathering dust in
the drawers of Brazil's federal govern-
ment for more than a decade: divert-
ing the So Francisco River, an idea
that traces back to the beginning of
last century and that has re-emerged
with every drought in the area. The
diversion would create a man-made
channel to bring water to 2,100 kilo-
meters of dried-up riverbeds. At
least six million inhabitants would
benefit from the water supply, and
the project would create 1.2 million
direct and indirect jobs on 333,000
newly irrigated hectares of land.
With adequate water supplies, agro-
industry could change the profile of
the whole region. The media recently
began publicizing the project and the
Lula administration is consulting
ecologists in an attempt to revive it.
Drought is not a problem con-
fined to the northeastern part of the
country. Its human effects spill over
to the rest of Brazilian society. Since
1991, I have been researching what I
call "modern forms of slavery" in
Brazil. I haven't found people in
shackles or public floggings; the
methods used to enslave human
beings today are more sophisticated,
and therefore more difficult to detect
and fight. Modern-day slaves work
as day laborers, sugar cane cutters,
rubber gatherers, charcoal burners
and farm hands conned into corrupt
labor relations that imply slavery
through debt. The overwhelming
majority of the workers are migrants
and refugees from northeastern
regions historically scourged by
drought. People from these areas
also account for a large percentage of
residents in the favelas (shantytowns)
of Rio de Janeiro and So Paulo.
Formal employment simply does
not exist in the rural areas of the
sertdo. People try to make a living
on small plots of cleared land.
Without water, there can be no crop,
no income, or anything to eat. This
is the ground where the age-old
plague of slavery flourishes and
spreads in its modern forms, creating
an army of cheap, unskilled laborers
to serve the economic system.
People who have no other options
will work in exchange for food or
ridiculously low wages if their only
alternative is to go hungry. U
Ricardo Funari is a photojournalist in
Brazil. He directs SocialPhotos,
a cooperative ofphotographers that
creates and distributes images docu-
menting and addressing issues of social
justice. More examples of his work can
be viewed at www.photobrazil com
and www.socialphotos.com.
Opposite, top: Soledade, Paraiba.
A girl plays in a dry dam used
nowadays as a soccer field.
Opposite, bottom: Barra de Santa
Rosa, Paraiba. In drought condi-
tions, residents must walk up to
several miles for clean water, car-
rying heavy buckets back home.
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Barra de Santa Rosa, Paraiba. Refugees from drought and poverty in the sertdo pass a grave beside the road.
Soledade, Paraiba. A municipal
clerk supervises people waiting in
line for water from a desalinator.
Each family is allotted two buck-
ets of clean water every other day.
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Soledade, Paraiba. Food is in short supply for many rural families.
Brejinho, Pernambuco.
A volunteer agent of the NGO
Pastoral da Crianfa monitors
children's weight with a scale to
check for infant malnutrition.
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Santa Cruz da Baixa Verde, Pernambuco. The Catholic Church distributes basic goods to rural residents
affected by drought.
Juazeiro do Norte, Ceard.
Ca holi Mass
The faithful crowd an outdoor
<, a
Opposite: Afogados da Ingazeira,
Pernambuco. Rural residents of
the sertdo receive only sporadic
medical care, relying on their
Catholic faith instead. On the
wall are pictures of Padre Cicero
and Frei Damido, revered clergy-
men who ministered to the rural
i northeast.
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Bananeiras, Paraiba. A 72-year-old man embraces his six-year-old son.
Pernambuco. Like many others
before them, a family of rural
migrants from the sertdo tries to
hitch a ride to Sdo Paulo, South
America's largest city. President
Lula made a similar trip with his
mother and six siblings in 1952,
when he was seven years old. The
family traveled on the back of a
truck from Garanhuns,
Pernambuco, to Sdo Paulo. The
trip took 13 days.
36 Hemisphere Volume 15
SocialPho os
documentary photography advocating change
J.R. Ripper/SocialPhotos
SocialPhotos is a cooperative of photographers
that works to create and distribute images docu-
menting and addressing issues of social justice. We
actively strive to build collaborative relationships with
progressive organizations engaged in work on the
issues we cover, in order to encourage the most
effective, constructive use of our photos.
Online photo catalog at:
http://www.socialphotos.com/
There you will find: human rights, exploitation & mod-
ern slavery, Third World-related subjects, poverty &
hunger, housing & health, children in risky situations,
women's issues, social work, religion, environmental
degradation, minorities...
And also those same people laughing, playing,
loving, dancing, sharing, giving a hand, dreaming...
SocialPholos.com by Ricardo funari Tel. +55-21-22650974 -[mail socialphotos@socialphoos.com -Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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US-Brazilian Relations
by Donna J. Hrinak
The United States and Brazih A
Long Road of Unmet Expectations
By Monica Hirst; conclusion by
Andrew Hurrell. London, New
York: Routledge, 2004, 160 pages.
$75 hardcover; $18.95 paperback.
The US-Brazil relationship is so
complex and so different from US
relations with the countries of
Hispanic America that, even
among hemispheric policy makers,
few in the United States under-
stand it. When other countries of
the region looked to the United
States for leadership, Brazil sought
partnership. When others looked
northward for direction, Brazil
looked inward. US insensitivity to
the differences Brazil cherishes,
combined with Brazil's insistence
that it owes the US no explana-
tions, have for too many years left
each side believing the other has
acted unreasonably, capriciously or
simply from a desire to provoke.
As this book notes, the result has
been "unmet expectations" in both
countries.
By discussing the contemporary
bilateral relationship in historical
context and examining some of the
factors shaping it today, Monica
Hirst does an admirable job of
describing what makes US relations
with Brazil different from those
with other countries in the region,
explaining the complexities of
alliance between two of what
George Kennan has termed the
world's five "monster" countries.
But Hirst's task, complicated from
the start, is made more difficult by
the format of the series of which it
forms a part.
According to the producers of
Routledge's series on Contemporary
Inter-American Relations, the books
are deliberately short, in part to
encourage further study. That
approach worked well in the one
other book in the set with which I
am familiar, The United States and
Venezuela, by Carlos Romero and
the late Janet Kelly. But in the case
of Brazil, brevity confines the
author to raising topics rather than
examining them in depth. Chapter
Three's discussion of Brazilian and
US voting patterns in the United
Nations, for example, would have
benefited from an explanation that
differences often stem from long-
held Brazilian foreign policy tenets,
such as an unwillingness to approve
single-country human rights resolu-
tions. I kept feeling that Hirst
wanted to say more but was run-
ning out of space. More informa-
tion on certain points in the first
part of the book also would have
given Andrew Hurrell's conclusion a
stronger foundation.
Still, when issues are relatively
unexplored, as are many of those
which Hirst presents, even a men-
tion can be worthwhile and positive.
This is particularly true of two top-
ics she raises at the end of Chapter
Three: 1) Brazilian immigration to
the United States, and 2) public
perceptions of the other in each
country.
Many immigrant populations
have influenced relations between
their native country and the United
States. Mexico comes to mind first,
of course, as well as the Dominican
Republic and, recently, Venezuela.
Few Americans are aware of the
growing Brazilian population in the
US, but its development is well
worth watching, perhaps even for
the day when the US Congressional
Hispanic Caucus has to change its
name to accommodate a new
Brazilian-American member.
Hirst only briefly mentions the
flip side of the new Brazilian pres-
ence in the United States: growing
US investment in Brazil. This
investment comes not from Silicon
Valley or the Fortune 500, but from
hundreds and thousands of Midwest
farmers who are forming coopera-
tives to buy land in Brazil. Their
potential to influence decisions on
agricultural issues in particular is
similarly worth following. Cases
like the recent anti-dumping charges
brought in the US against Brazilian
shrimp, for instance, could be han-
dled quite differently in the future
as the number of US citizens with
shrimp farms in Brazil increases.
As for public opinion, Hirst cor-
rectly notes that much work
remains to be done on both sides if
Brazilians and Americans are to
develop a more complete and bal-
anced understanding of each others'
culture and world view. Expanding
the current modest level of exchange
programs and targeting more public
affairs resources to work with young
people should be a priority for both
countries. Under Ambassador
Rubens Barbosa, the Brazilian
Embassy in Washington began a
major school outreach program, but
other options, such as creating a
Brazilian version of the US
International Visitors program for
young professionals, remain unex-
plored.
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Another important and controver-
sial issue Hirst takes on at several
points in the book is the dominant
role of Itamaraty, the Brazilian
Foreign Ministry, in foreign policy
making. Itamaraty "remains the
main state agency" on trade issues,
she notes, while the State
Department doesn't even figure
among the three US government
agencies responsible for economic
relations with Latin America.
US diplomats can only envy
Itamaraty's role. Members of the
Brazilian Foreign Service act as
international affairs advisors to other
cabinet members and can themselves
aspire to cabinet posts outside the
Foreign Ministry. This was the path
followed by former Industry and
Development Minister Sergio
Amaral, former Defense Minister
Jose Viegas, and former Science and
Technology Minister Ronaldo
Sardenberg. Brazil's relatively under-
developed civil service system gener-
ally means that Itamaraty career
functionaries are the most prepared
to assume positions throughout the
government, and their presence in
all key agencies has allowed them to
spread the Foreign Ministry's world
view in all administrations.
Nevertheless, Hirst reports chal-
lenges to Itamaraty's dominance
from other ministries that share
growing responsibility for foreign
affairs, particularly foreign economic
issues. Another area worthy of
broader discussion, therefore, is the
potential influence on US-Brazil
relations of the increasingly louder
voices of these new actors.
In addition to its limited space for
discussion, another of this book's
flaws is the inclusion of certain
minor but significant factual errors.
According to Hirst, for example, the
US "praised the Brazilian govern-
ment for its... military air intercep-
tion program" to fight narcotics traf-
ficking. In fact, the Brazilian shoot-
down law (Lei do Abate) is a prime
example of the various misunder-
standings at play in the bilateral rela-
tionship. Brazil expected the US to
be pleased with this signal of its clear
intent to fight traffickers, but the
new regulations ran afoul of a US
law-passed after the tragic down-
ing in Peru of a plane with US mis-
sionaries on board-prohibiting
assistance to countries whose laws
place civilian aircraft at risk.
Because of US concerns, Brazil wait-
ed until 2004 to implement the law,
five years after its passage and after
many domestic complaints about
US infringement of the nation's sov-
ereignty.
Hirst also cites a Brazilian
Embassy report claiming that US
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tariffs on Brazil's top exports aver-
aged 45.6%, in contrast to Brazil's
14.3% average tariff on leading
exports from the US. While tech-
nically correct, this calculation is
misleading. It includes the 350%
tariff imposed on tobacco imported
from Brazil above the quota set for
this commodity, but in fact that
tariff has never been imposed
because Brazil has never come even
close to filling its quota. It is this
type of simplistic information
about complex subjects that irri-
tates the US and embitters the
atmosphere of already difficult
bilateral trade talks.
The transition from the four
chapters written by Hirst to the
concluding essay by Andrew
Hurrell is less than smooth, but
Hurrell makes an important contri-
bution by considering US-Brazil
relations in a global context.
Perhaps most useful is his examina-
tion of Brazil's uncertainty about its
place in the world; in particular, its
unwillingness to accept the respon-
sibilities of leadership while clamor-
ing for respect. Also thoughtful is
his point that while Brazil and the
US may share important values-
support for democracy, for exam-
ple-they differ seriously over how
to promote those values and which
elements to prioritize. The discus-
sion helps readers understand the
static in a relationship between two
countries whose core values coin-
cide.
Hurrell also reinforces one of
Hirst's essential points, about the
link between Brazil's foreign and
development policies. Business and
commercial interests are essential
components of Brazil's modern for-
eign policy, but economic develop-
ment has never been an important
factor in US global affairs. The US
largely fails to recognize the impor-
tance Brazil places on the link
between its development and events
in the rest of the world. By empha-
sizing and explaining this link,
Hirst and Hurrell make an impor-
tant contribution to US under-
standing of Brazilian identity.
A more complete view of US-
Brazilian relations requires substan-
tially more discussion than this
book offers, but to the extent Hirst
and Hurell raise questions and a
desire for further knowledge they
will have succeeded in advancing
the "mature partnership" the two
countries deserve. The directors of
the project on Contemporary Inter-
American Relations deserve praise
for including this essential topic in
this series.
Finally, it's worth repeating the
quote Hirst includes by former
Brazilian Foreign Minister Juracy
Magalhaes, who in 1966 famously
declared, "What's good for the
United States is also good for
Brazil." That may not always be
true; however, what's good for the
US can also be good for Brazil, and
vice versa. By recognizing the com-
plexities in our relationship, we can
more successfully identify where
our common interests lie and work
more collaboratively to promote
them.
Donna J. Hrinak is the former US
ambassador to Brazil. She is current-
ly co-chair of the International Trade,
Competition and Government
Practice at Steel, Hector & Davis
LLP in Miami.
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6TH CONFERENCE ON CUBAN AND CUBAN-AMERICAN STUDIES
presented by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University
October 27-29, 2005
The Cuban Research Institute continues the tradition of convening scholars
engaged in the study of Cuba and Cuban-Americans by presenting its 6th Conference.
The theme of this year's conference is "Politics and Culture.'
For further information about the conference and other CRI activities,
please see our website at http://lacc.fiu.edu/cri/ or contact us at:
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
DM 363, University Park, Miami, FL 33199 * (305) 348-1991/crinst@fiu.edu
Now Available from Routledge
Pik al (orruption n the
haib an m~ Political Corruption in the
Caribbean Basin
Constructing a Theory to Combat Corruption
by Michael W. Collier
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines
government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of inter-
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be
worsening in the post-Cold War period. This work discovers why efforts to arrest corruption are failing
by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean.
The study's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of political corruption built with-
in the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The analysis first employs a rational choice
analysis that broadly explains differing levels of state corruption. The constructivist theory of social rules
is then employed to establish the political, economic, and social factors that cause varying levels of polit-
ical corruption. Case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica are included.
List Price: $85.00
ISBN: 0415973287
Publication Date: 4/13/2005
Pages: 240 pages
To order in the US, Latin America,
and Caribbean contact:
Routledge
c/o Taylor & Francis
10650 Toebben Drive
Independence, KY 41051
Call toll-free (800) 634-7064
Call international (859) 525-2230
Fax toll-free (800) 248-4724
Fax international (859) 647-5027
Email: cserve@taylorandfrancis.com
To order in Canada,
contact:
Routledge
c/o Taylor & Francis
74 Rolark Drive
Scarborough, Ontario M1R 4G2
Canada
Call toll-free (877) 226-2237
Fax (416) 299-7531
Email: tal_fran@istar.com
Web: www.routledge-ny.com
Web: www.routledge-ny.com
Lula and the Workers' Party
by Marian GoslingaOn October 27, 2002,
the Brazilian people
elected Luiz Inicio
Lula da Silva, the
leader of the
Workers' Party (PT) and a former
metalworker, to the presidency with
61% of the popular vote. This
unusual result was partly a reflec-
tion of a gradual shift within the
Brazilian labor movement from
radical socialism as a political
objective to more pragmatic politi-
cal and economic strategies.
This bibliography, drawing upon
diverse sources, sheds light on con-
ditions in today's Brazil, with an
emphasis on selections about Lula
and the Workers' Party. The main
focus of most of the entries is eco-
nomic, reflecting both the main
challenge Lula faces and the top
preoccupation of analysts con-
cerned about Brazil's economic
future under his left-leaning admin-
istration.
In addition to the more recent
titles listed below, two older but
informative books on the formation
and early experiences of the PT are
Rachel Meneguello, A formacdo de
um partido, 1979-1982 (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1989)
and Margaret Keck, The Workers'
Party and Democratization in Brazil
(New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992).
Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. "La
politica externa del nuevo gobier-
no del Presidente Luiz Inicio Lula
da Silva: retrospectiva historica y
evaluacion pragmitica." Revista
Espacio Academico, v. 2, no. 19
(December 2002): 19-37.
Almeida, Thomas. The Brazilian
Economy and President Lula [video
recording]. 2003. 1 videocassette
Alves, Brito. A histdria de Lula: o
operdrio presidente. Rio de Janeiro:
Espago e Tempo, 2003. 191 pp.
(Published in 2004 in Spanish as La
historia de Lula: de obrero a presidente
by Editorial Oveja Negra, Bogota,
Colombia.)
Aragdo, Murillo de. "Lula at the
Halfway Point." LatinFinance
(September 2004): 38-41.
Bacha, Edmar Lisboa. "Elementos
para uma economia politica das
reformas no governo Lula." Revista
de Economia Politica (Brazil), v. 24,
no. 1 (January-March 2004): 17-28.
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, ed. Radicals
in Power: The Workers'Party (P)
and Experiments in Urban
Democracy in Brazil New York,
NY: Zed Books (distributed by
Palgrave), 2003. 254 pp.
Betto, Frei. "Dilemas da politica
economica." Caros Amigos, v. 8, no.
95 (February 2005): 6-12.
. "Lula: detalhes biografi-
cos," Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 67
(October 2002): 26-27.
. "O significado da vitoria
de Lula para a esquerda: a estrela
sobe." Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 69
(December 2002): 18-20.
Branford, Sue, Bernardo Kucinski,
and Hilary Wainwright. Lula and
the Workers' Party in Brazil. New
York, NY: New Press, 2003. 144 pp.
(Originally published under the title
Politics Transformed.)
Carvalhal, Eugenio do. "Os nego-
ciadores de Lula." Conjuntura
Economica, v. 57, no. 2 (February
2003): 40-43.
Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim de,
and Fernando Ferrari Filho. "El
presidente Lula da Silva en el
primer tercio de su mandato."
Investigacidn Econdmica, v. 63, no.
249 (July/September 2004): 55-74.
(Analyzes Lula's economic policies
after the first third of his term, focus-
ing on policy strategies.)
Cavalcanti, Luiz Otivio. O que d o
governo Lula. Sao Paulo: Landy
Editora, 2003. 77 pp.
Coggiola, Osvaldo. Governo Lula:
da esperanfa a realidade. Sio
Paulo: Xamd, 2004. 181 pp.
Coligagio Lula Presidente. Programa
de governo 2002: um Brasil para
todos. Sdo Paulo: Comitd Lula
Presidente, 2002. 88 pp.
Corazza, Gentil, and Fernando
Ferrari Filho. "A politica economica
do governo Lula no primeiro ano
de mandato: perplexidades, dile-
mas, resultados e alternativas."
Indicadores Economicos FEE, v. 32,
no. 1 (May 2004): 243-251.
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Dathein, Ricardo. "Governo Lula:
uma alternativa de politica
economica para evitar seu fracasso
e atingir o desenvolvimento con
estabilidade de preeos." Indicadores
Econamicos FEE, v. 31, no. 4
(February 2004): 229-258.
Diaz, Leonardo. Lula. Barcelona,
Spain: Ediciones de la Tempestad,
2004. 124 pp.
. "O que o Brasil pode
esperar do governo Lula."
Conjuntura Economica, v. 57, no. 2
(February 2003): 24-26.
Fausto Neto, Antonio, Eliseo Ver6n,
and Antonio Albino Rubim. Lula
presidente: televisdo e politica na
campanha eleitoral Sao Paulo:
Hacker, 2003. 174 pp.
Figueira Leal, Paulo Roberto. O PT
e o dilema da representafdo politi-
ca. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da
Fundagio Getulio Vargas, 2005.
128 pp.
Furuguem, Alberto. "Para onde
vamos com Lula? Dois cenarios."
Conjuntura Econamica, v. 57, no. 4
(April 2003): 12-15.
Giambiagi, Fabio, Josd Guilherme
Reis, and Andre Urani. Reformas
no Brasil. balanfo e agenda. Sao
Paulo: Nova Fronteira, 2004.
543 pp.
Gacek, Stanley. "Lula and Chavez:
Differing Responses to the
Washington Consensus."
New Labor Forum, v. 13, no. 1
(Spring 2004): 40-49.
Genosko, Gary. The Party without
Bosses: Lessons on Anti-Capitalism
from Filix Guattari and Luiz
Indcio 'Lula' da Silva. Winnipeg,
Canada: Arbeiter Ring Pub., 2003.
87 pp. (Based on interviews.)
Godio, Julio, ed. Un PT en
Argentina? Reformular las formas
de pensar la politica para entender
la experiencia brasilenia. Buenos
Aires: Corregidor, 2003.
Gratius, Susanne. "La politica exte-
rior de Lula: ma's cambio que con-
tinuidad." Iberoamericana
(Germany), v. 4, Nueva epoca, no.13
(March 2004): 175-181.
Hakim, Peter. "The Reluctant
Partner." Foreign Affairs, v. 83, no.
1 (January/February 2004): 114-
123. (Suggestions for improving
US-Brazil relations.)
Hunter, Wendy. "Brazil's New
Direction." Journal of Democracy 14,
no. 2 (2003):151-162.
Indursky. Freda. "Discurso, lingua
e memoria: Lula-estrutura e acon-
tecimento." Organon, v. 17, no. 35
(2003): 101-122.
Lula (Luiz Inacio da Silva). Tengo
un sueso: cinco propuestas para
cambiar la historia. Barcelona,
Spain: Ediciones Peninsula, 2003.
91 pp. (Features speeches by Lula
from 2002-2003.)
Manzo, Paolo. Lula, elpresidente
dei poveri: un ex operaio alla
guida del Brasile. Milan, Italy:
Baldini & Castoldi, 2003. 149 pp.
Medeiros, Jarbas. "Simpatia para o
governo Lula." Caros Amigos, v. 6,
no. 70 (January 2003): 39-40.
Mendes, Candido. Lula. opfdo
mais que o voto. 5th ed., rev. Rio
de Janeiro: Garamond, 2003.
347 pp. (Attempts to explain Lula's
success at the polls.)
Minakata, Kazumi, Maria Alice
Vieira, and Alexandre Fortes.
Partido dos Trabalhadores:
trajetorias. 2d ed. Sao Paulo:
Editora Funda~ao Perseu Abramo,
2003. 143 pp. (Intellectual founda-
tions of Lula's government.)
Morrison, John. Luiz Indcio Lula
da Silva. Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea
House, 2004. 96 pp.
Nascimento, Joio. Lula: do agreste
ao planalto, 1945-2003. Lisboa:
Editorial Noticias, 2003. 138 pp.
Oz6rio de Almeida, Anna.
"Continuity and Change in the PT
Government." Centro Studi di
Politica Internazionale, Working
Papers (November 2004).
Parana, Denise. Lula, elhijo de
Brasil Marcelo Canossa, trans.
Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo,
2003. 464 pp. (Translation of Lula,
oflho de Brasil)
Paula, Antonio de. A economia
politica da mudanfa: os desafios e
os equivocos do inicio do governo
Lula. Belo Horizonte: Autentica,
2003. 2 54 pp.
Pochmann, Marcio, ed. Atlas da
exclusdo social no Brasi: os ricos
no Brasil Sao Paulo: Cortez
Editora, 2004. 204 pp. (Features a
regional breakdown of wealth distri-
bution.)
Riethof, Marieke. "Changing
Strategies of the Brazilian Labor
Movement: From Opposition to
Participation." Latin American
Perspectives, v. 31, no. 6 (November
2004): 31-47.
Rodrigues, Iram Jacome. "O papel
dos sindicatos no governo Lula."
Conjuntura Economica, v. 57, no. 9
(September 2003): 36-41.
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Sallum, Basilio, and Eduardo
Kugelmas. "Gobierno de Lula:
icontinuidad, avance o retroceso?"
In La Argentina de Kirchner y el Brasil
de Lula, edited by Carlos Chacho
Alvarez (Buenos Aires: Prometeo
Libros): 19-36.
Samuels, David J. "From Socialism
to Social Democracy: Party
Organization and the Transforma-
tion of the Workers' Party in
Brazil." Comparative Political Studies
37, no. 9 (2004): 999-1024.
Schmidt, Benicio. "A politica
brasileira a partir de Lula."
Humanidades, no. 49 (January
2003): 54-65.
Soares, Laura Tavares, et al.
Governo Lula: decifrando o
enigma. SIo Paulo Viramundo,
2004. 190 pp. (Texts published in
"Outro Brasil" between September
2003 and March 2004.)
Summariva, Marco. Lula: storia,
idee, speranze. Rome:
Malatempora, 2003. 122 pp.
Trotter, Richard. "The New
Economic and Social Model: A
Third Stage of Economic and
Social Development in Brazil in
the Millennium." Journal of the
American Academy of Business, v. 4,
no. 1/2 (May 2004): 178-183.
Vasconcellos, Gilberto Felisberto.
"Medo do imperialismo
financeiro: o vacilo do Governo
Lula." Caros Amigos, v. 7, no. 75
(June 2003): 19-20.
"A mundanea da matriz
energitica da sociedade brasileira e
a perspectiva de Luiz Inacio Lula
fazer o seu sucessor en 2006."
Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 68
(November 2002): 17-18.
Velasco, Sebastiao C. and Ana Maria
Cruz. "Cambiando el rumbo: la
politica exterior del gobierno de
Lula." In La Argentina de Kirchner y
el Brasil de Lula, edited by Carlos
Chacho Alvarez (Buenos Aires:
Prometeo Libros): 117-132.
Vernengo, Matias. "External
Liberalization, Stabilization, and
the Labor Market in Brazil."
Latin American Perspectives, v. 31, no.
4 (July 2004): 62-75.
Wheatley, Jonathan. "Widening
Expectations." LatinFinance
(September 2004): 33-36. (Discusses
Brazil's economic upturn in August
2004.)
Winckler, Carlos Roberto, and
Salvatore Santagada. "Entre mun-
dan~a e estagnaqio: os indicadores
sociais na vigencia do Plano Real."
Indicadores Econdmicos FEE, v. 32,
no. 2 (August 2004 ): 155-174.
Zobel, Gibby, Jessie Sklair, and
Dylan Howitt. O Presidente
engraxate/ The Shoeshine President
[video recording] Rio de Janeiro:
Filmes; distributed by Latin
American Videoarchives, 2003. 1
videocassette. (In Portuguese with
English subtitles) U
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean bibliographer at
Florida International University.
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Now Available from Indiana University Press
Camargo Guarnieri, Brazilian Composer:
A Study of His Creative Life and Works
by Marion Verhaalen
Published in April 2005, this book provides the first com-
prehensive overview of Guarnieri's life and works in
English, along with a CD compilation of representative
works.
Marion Verhaalen is a teacher, composer and
author who teaches at the Wisconsin Conservatory of
Music in Milwaukee. She has spent time in Brazil as both
researcher and teacher, including a semester on a
Fulbright Professorship at the Federal University in P6rto
Aleg re.
302 pp., 36 b&w illus., append., notes, bibl., index, 6x9
Cloth, ISBN 0-253-34475-1, $60
Available at bookstores or by calling (800) 842-6796
ank.d Caribbe.n
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BRA
BRASA is an international, interdisciplinary group of
scholars who support and promote Brazilian studies in
all fields, especially in the humanities and social sciences.
BRASA is dedicated to the promotion of Brazilian studies
around the world in general, and in the United States in
particular.
BRASA organizes an international congress on Brazilian
studies every other year. The most recent congress,
BRASA VII, was held at the Pontificia Universidade
Cat6lica in Rio de Janeiro in June 2004. BRASA VIII will
take place in October 2006 at Vanderbilt University in
Nashville, Tennessee, USA.
A call for papers and panel proposals will be issued in
April 2005 for BRASA VIII with a deadline for submissions
expected to be in December 2005.
BRASA currently has more than 600 members in the
United States, Brazil, Europe, and many other Latin
American countries.
For more information, see our new
website at www.brasa.org.
Brazilian Studies Association
VU Station B 350031
2301 Vanderbilt Place
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee 37235-0031
U.S.A.
615-322-2527 (tel)
615-343-6002 (fax)
e-mail: brasa@vanderbilt.edu
President:
Timothy J. Power,
Florida International University
Vice President:
Kenneth P. Serbin,
University of San Diego
Executive Director:
Marshall C. Eakin,
Vanderbilt University
Agod0
Brazilian
Studies
Association
4
4I
4
